Whose Bodies Count? How Experience Working with Transgender Patients Shapes Conceptualizations of Transgender Identity by Buckner, Ray
CTSJ
CRITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH
OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE
FALL  20 16
VOL. 6
52
Whose Bodies Count?  
How Experience Working with Transgender Patients Shapes 
Conceptualizations of Transgender Identity
Ray Buckner
Occidental College ‘16
ABSTRACT
In 2013, the American Psychological Association released the fifth edition of the Diagnostic Statistical 
Manual (DSM). Previous editions of the DSM had used the term “gender identity disorder” (GID) to 
classify people who felt that the gender they were assigned at birth was incongruent with the gender 
identity they currently hold. The DSM-5 task force devoted to sexual and gender disorders spent years 
receiving feedback about the diagnosis and concluded that the gender dysphoria (GD) diagnosis would 
replace GID. This research project seeks to understand the personal conceptualizations of transgender 
identity advanced by medical and mental health practitioners, particularly in light of the newly 
constructed GD diagnosis. 
I conducted 15 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with therapists, psychologists, and psychiatrists in 
New York City; Westchester County, New York; and Los Angeles. I found that practitioners with extensive 
experience working with transgender patients overwhelmingly advanced social constructionist and 
agential conceptualizations of transgender identity, whereas those with some or no such experience 
overwhelmingly advanced essentialist formulations. In addition, I inductively found that practitioners 
who received “feminist teachings” tended to advance a social constructionist understanding 
of transgender identity, but those without this background maintained mostly essentialist 
conceptualizations of transgender identity.
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 In 2013, the American Psychological Association released the fifth edition of the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual	(DSM).	This	latest	edition	was	intended	to	take	a	major	step	away	
from the previous versions in its stance on disorders related to gender identity. Earlier editions 
of	the	DSM	used	transsexualism	and	gender	identity	disorder	(GID)	to	classify	people	who	
felt that the gender with which they were born was incongruent with the gender identity that 
they	currently	hold.	Many	transgender	organizations	and	individuals	found	the	GID	diagnosis	
oppressive and pathologizing toward transgender individuals.1	The	DSM-5	task	force	devoted	
to sexual and gender disorders spent years receiving feedback from transgender advocacy 
organizations, academics, and medical practitioners regarding the new diagnosis: Should 
the	GID	diagnosis	be	eliminated	altogether?	Should	it	be	revised?	Ultimately,	the	task	force	
decided	that	“gender	dysphoria	(GD)	in	adolescents/adults”	and	“GD	in	children”	would	
replace	GID.2
 This research project examines the personal conceptualizations of transgender identity 
advanced by medical and mental health practitioners, particularly in light of these newly 
constructed	and	released	DSM-5	GD	diagnoses.	The	15	therapists,	psychologists,	and	psychologists	
interviewed for this study echo words and thematic reasoning in line with current debates between 
two	lines	of	research	on	transgender	identities:	transgender	theorists	(e.g.,	Leslie	Feinberg,	Richard	
Green,	and	Jay	Prosser)	and	queer	theorists	(e.g.,	Judith	Butler,	Jacob	Hale,	Cressida	Heyes,	
and	Gayle	Salamon).	The	transgender	theorists	tend	to	view	identity	as	stable,	real,	biological,	
hard-wired,	natural,	and	reflective	of	a	true	inner	core,3 whereas queer theorists explain identity 
as discursively constructed, socially bound, socially regulated, and almost entirely socially 
constituted.4 Although these theories seem in ideological opposition, this stark divide implodes in 
practical	application.	I	find	that	practitioners	unconsciously	pull	from	both	essentialist	and	social	
constructionist	camps	(sometimes	even	within	one	sentence)	when	explaining	their	understanding	
of transgender identity. 
 Conceptualizations of transgender identity offered in this study both mirror and expand on 
existing	theories	of	gender	identity	(and	identity	more	broadly)	and	reflect	certain	ways	of	knowing.	
This	project	calls	into	question	hegemonic	discourses,	or	“models	that	equate	discourse	with	truth	
...	[and]	expose	the	ways	in	which	discourse	objectified	as	truth	both	forms	and	sustains	collective	
definitions,	social	arrangements,	and	hierarchies	of	power.”5	By	revealing	the	(always)	active	power	
1.	Griet	De	Cuypere,	Gail	Knudson,	and	Walter	Bockting,	“Response	of	the	World	Professional	Association	for	Transgender	
Health	to	the	Proposed	DSM	5	Criteria	for	Gender	Incongruence,”	International	Journal	of	Transgenderism	12,	no.	2	
(2010):	119–23;	Jaime	Grant,	“National	Gay	and	Lesbian	Task	Force	Commentary	on	Proposed	Revisions	to	the	American	
Psychiatric	Association’s	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual-V.”	www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/release_
materials/tf_dsm_commentary.pdf.		
2.	Kenneth	Zucker	et	al.,	“Memo	Outlining	Evidence	for	Change	for	Gender	Identity	Disorder	in	the	DSM-5.”	Archives of 
Sexual Behavior 42	(2013):	901–14.
3.	Mary	Bernstein,	“Identity	Politics,”	Annual Review of Sociology	31	(2005):	47–74;	Talia	Bettcher,	“Feminist	Perspectives	on	
Trans Issues,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.)	(2014).		
4.	Ibid;	Judith	Butler,	Undoing Gender	(New	York:	Routledge,	2004).
5.		Karen	A.	Cerulo,	“Identity	Construction:	New	Issues,	New	Directions,”	Annual Review of Sociology	23	(1997):	391.
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structures	and	unraveling	dominant	discourses	in	the	medical	field,	practitioners	can	begin	to	(re)
think which patients and narratives count as comprehensible.6
A Note on Subjectivity
	 As	Judith	Butler’s	concepts	of	relationality	and	subjectivity	show,	there	is	an	“I”	behind	(or	
in	fact	in	front	of)	this	writing	and	research	initiative.7	No	writer	can	be	truly	objective,	unaffected	
by	affect,	experience,	and	(always	present)	discourses.	This	“I”	that	I	both	do	and	do	not	possess	is	
always already guided by exterior forces as well as internal forces that push me to think, feel, and 
act in particular ways. Whether reading literature, constructing interview questions, conducting 
interviews,	or	analyzing	interview	content,	my	writing	and	findings	are	always,	in	some	small	or	
large	part,	impacted	and	driven	by	my	“I.”
	 As	Judith	Butler	noted,	while	one	can	aim	to	(re)claim	one’s	“I,”	one	is	also	subject	at	any	
given	point	to	forces	that	exist	far	beyond	and	within	the	subject	that	limit	a	subject’s	ability	to	
speak unhindered, with full clarity, without discourse.8 Overall, I aimed to conduct this study 
methodologically, ethically, and mindfully. Even with this intent, my analysis will be impacted by my 
specific	way	of	seeing,	hearing,	and	understanding.	
The DSM and Its Essentialist Foundations
	 The	DSM	is	considered	the	“the	authoritative	nomenclature	of	psychiatric	nosology	within	
the Western world.”9 It is used by psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and outside third-
parties	(e.g.,	insurance	companies)	for	“clinical,	research,	and	educational	purposes.”10 
 
6.	(In)comprehensibility	in	the	medical	realm	has	major	legal	and	interpersonal	ramifications	for	transgender	patients	
seeking	treatment	(Dean	Spade,	“Resisting	Medicine,	Re/modeling	Gender,”	Berkeley Women’s Law Journal	18	(2003):	14–37).	
Practitioners’	ability	to	comprehend	transgender	patients’	narratives	may	have	deep	implications	for	treatment,	recognition,	
and validation of their identity and visions of themselves. For example, if a patient advances a certain conceptualization 
of	transgender	identity	that	is	in	line	with	a	medical	practitioner’s	particular	understanding	of	transgender	identity,	that	
patient	may	receive	recognition	(that	is,	the	ability	to	be	seen	and	understood	as	the	patient	sees	and	understands	his	or	
herself)	and	affirming	treatment	(that	is,	the	psychical	and	systemic	support	of	practitioners	in	affirmation	of	a	patient’s	
needs	and	desires).	While	another	patient	whose	body	or	narrative	does	not	fit	this	practitioner’s	preconceived	notions	may	
risk	misrecognition	(defined	here	as	the	misunderstanding	and	lack	of	clear	seeing	of	a	patient’s	sense	of	self	and	narrative)	
and	receive	non-affirming	treatment	(defined	here	as	a	lack	of	psychical	and	systemic	support	in	pursuit	of	hormonal	or	
surgical	needs	and	treatments).	
7.	Judith	Butler,	Senses of the Subject	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2015).
8.	Butler,	Judith.	Undoing Gender. 
9.	Arlene	I.	Lev,	“Disordering	Gender	Identity:	Gender	Identity	Disorder	in	the	DSM-IV-TR,”	Journal of Psychology and 
Human Sexuality	17,	no.	3-4	(2005):	36.
10. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,	4th	ed.	(Washington,	DC:	
American	Psychiatric	Association,	2000),	quoted	in	Randall	D.	Ehrbar,	“Consensus	from	Differences:	Lack	of	Professional	
Consensus	on	the	Retention	of	the	Gender	Identity	Disorder	Diagnosis,”	International Journal of Transgenderism 12, no. 2 
(2010):	60–4.
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	 The	DSM	has	faced	criticism	from	clinicians,	academics,	and	activists	for	enacting	arbitrary,	
pathologizing, and constricting measures on human ways of being.11 Psychologist and historical 
theorist	Michel	Foucault	documented	how	the	medical	complex	uses	diagnoses	to	define	and,	
therein, socially and institutionally control certain behaviors.12 
	 The	DSM	is	grounded	on	essentialist	foundations—foundations	based	in	a	fundamental	
belief	in	some	corporeal	and	psychical	(ab)normality.13	Diagnoses	within	the	DSM	operate	as	though	
outside construction, meaning that a diagnosis exists because a person is not acting or behaving in 
accordance	with	that	which	is	considered	internally	or	biologically	“normal.”14 Diagnoses, thus, stem 
from the acceptance of certain innate, biological ways of being. They fail, however, to look critically 
at the ways in which such standards of normality are guided by societal forces and judgments rather 
than biological grounding.15
	 The	medical	apparatus,	through	the	GID	diagnosis,	has	played	an	intimate	and	defining	role	
in constructing and enforcing rules of normality, beginning with the name of the diagnosis itself. In 
current	usage,	the	term	“disorder”	places	emphasis,	blame,	and	stigma	on	an	individual’s	“internal”	
gender identity rather than on a society that marks particular gender behaviors as atypical.16
	 Scholars	argue	that	sexism,	transphobia,	heterosexism,	and	ableism	undergird	the	GID	
diagnosis.	They	contend	that	GID	reinforces	stigmas	that	serve	to	socially	control	certain	gender	
11.	Laura	S.	Brown,	Subversive Dialogues: Theory in Feminist Therapy	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	1994);	Butler,	Undoing Gender;	
Paula J. Caplan, They Say You’re Crazy.	(New	York:	Addison-Wesley,	1995);	Stuart	Kirk	and	Herb	Kutchins,	Making Us 
Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1996);	Lev;	Saralyn	Russell,	
“Deconstructing	a	DSM	Diagnosis:	Gender	Identity	Disorder	(GID)	in	Adolescents	and	Adults,”	Western Undergraduate 
Psychology Journal	1,	no.	1	(2014):	1–10;	Spade;	Jerome	C.	Wakefield,	“Diagnosing	DSM-IV–Part 1: DSM-IV and the Concept 
of	Mental	Disorder,”	Behavior Research and Therapy	35,	no.	7	(1997):	633–49.
12.	Michel	Foucault,	Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason,	trans.	Richard	Howard	(New	York:	
Pantheon	Books/Random	House,	1965).	In	fact,	there	exists	a	long	medicalization	and	policing	of	social	behaviors	based	
on	racial,	religious,	sexual,	gender,	class,	and	ability	lines.	See	Brown;	John	D’Emilio,	Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: 
The Making of the Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940–1970	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1983);	Kirk	and	
Kutchins;	and	Siobhan	B.	Somerville,	Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture 
(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2000).
13.	Lev.
14. Spade.
15.	Lev.
16.	Jack	Drescher,	“Queer	Diagnoses:	Parallels	and	Contrasts	in	the	History	of	Homosexuality,	Gender	Variance,	and	
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,” Archives of Sexual Behavior	39	(2010):	427–60;	Ehrbar;	Darryl	B.	Hill	et	al.,	“Gender	
Identity Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence: A Critical Inquiry,” Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 17, no. 3-4 
(2005):	7–34;	Dan	Karasic	and	Jack	Drescher,	“Sexual	and	Gender	Diagnoses of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual	(DSM):	
A Reevaluation,” Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality	17,	no.	3-4	(2005):	1–5;	Lev;	Russell;	Spade;	Kelley	Winters,	
“Gender	Dissonance:	Diagnostic	Reform	of	Gender	Identity	Disorder	for	Adults,” Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 
17,	no.	3-4	(2005):	71–90.
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behaviors by uplifting and normalizing others.17	Lev,	Spade,	and	Vanderburgh	argue	that	diagnostic	
criteria	in	children	rely	on	stereotypical	and	normative	notions	of	proper/normal	“female”	and	
“male”	behavior.18
	 Overall,	the	DSM	stands	as	a	particular	and	forceful	space	for	essentialist	understandings	of	
the	self.	Gender	identity	diagnoses	appearing	in	the	DSM	have	used	strict,	biological	foundations	to	
conceptualize	transgender	identity.	The	DSM	is	thus	a	significant	site	for	not	only	the	exploration	of	
but also the creation of gender norms, rules, and understanding.
Essentialism in Transgender Theory 
 Essentialist modes of thinking rely on the body as a material and real ontological fact.19 In this 
conceptualization, the body exists as the natural container of an inner, true, core gender.20 Proponents 
of	essentialism	(like	Jay	Prosser	and	more	historically—and	notably	oppressively—Janice	Raymond)	
largely believe in the existence of a naturally sexed body that inhabits a true inner gender identity 
prior to socialization.21 Thus, feminine social behavior is indicative of an inner feminine self, which 
aligns	with	that	“female”	sexed	body.22 
	 This	configuration	relies	on	a	binary	conception	of	gender	in	which	a	transgender	individual	
switches	“from	one	sex	to	the	other”—a	consequence	of	being	born	“into	the	wrong	body.”	“Born	
in the wrong body” narratives necessitate a certain stabilization of identity or, at the very least, 
the treatment of said identity as real and reifying.23 For many theorists, most notably Jay Prosser, 
narratives are central to the construction of an intelligible and coherent self, body, and story.24
 
17.	Ehrbar;	Hill	et	al.;	Lev;	Deana	Morrow	and	Lori	Messinger,	Sexual Orientation and Gender Expression in Social Work 
Practice: Working with Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender People	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2006);	Reid	
Vanderburgh,	“Appropriate	Therapeutic	Care	for	Families	with	Prepubescent	Transgender/	Gender	Dissonant	Children,”	
Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal	26	(2009):	135–54;	Winters.
18.	For	the	remainder	of	the	text,	the	terms	“boy,”	“girl,”	“woman,”	“man,”	“female,”	and	“male”	will	be	placed	in	
quotation	marks	(except	when	stated	directly	by	an	interviewee).	I	do	so	in	an	effort	to	first	address	the	constructedness	of	
the	concepts	at	hand;	often	when	these	concepts	are	discussed	in	my	study,	mental	health	practitioners	speak	to	an	idea of 
what that concept acts, behaves, and looks like. In this way, one word/concept can connote multiple images, meanings and 
conceptualizations depending on the subject speaking the word. 
19.	Bernstein.
20.	Bettcher;	Judith	Butler,	Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity	(London:	Routledge	Classic,	1990).
21.	Butler,	Gender Trouble;	Jay	Prosser,	Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality	(New	York:	Columbia	University	
Press,	1998);	Janice	Raymond,	The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1979).
22.	Bettcher;	Butler,	“Gender Trouble”;	Prosser;	Gayle	Salamon,	Assuming a Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality	(New	
York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010).	
23.	Bernstein;	Cerulo.
24.	Bettcher.	In	fact,	many	naturalizing	discourses	can	be	found	in	transsexual	autobiographies.	See	Canary	Conn,	Canary: 
The Story of a Transsexual	(Los	Angeles:	Nash,	1974);	Cressida	Heyes,	“Feminist	Solidarity	after	Queer	Theory:	The	Case	of	
Transgender,” Signs	28,	no.	4	(2003):	1093–120;	Jan	Morris,	Conundrum	(New	York:	Harcourt	Brace	Jovanich,	1974);	Prosser.
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	 Importantly,	the	presence	of	essentialism	in	theory	is	not	unlike	the	medical	apparatus’	usage.	
Both	academic	theorists	and	those	constructing	and	informed	by	the	DSM	assume	a	self	who	has	
some	innate,	“already	there”	way	of	being.	Each	group	brings	with	it	specific	conceptualizations	of	
what	it	means	“to	be”	transgender	or	how	that	transgender	identity	is	to	be	embodied	or	expressed.
GENDER-BASED CULTURAL INCOMPETENCE IN THERAPY
	 Clinical	practices	have	historically	been	contentious	and	non-affirming	spaces	for	transgender	
and gender-variant people.25	The	Association	for	Lesbian,	Gay,	Bisexual,	and	Transgender	Issues	
in	Counseling	(ALGBTIC),	an	advocacy	group	composed	of	scholars	and	clinicians,	argues	that	
mental	health	professionals	have	been	“insensitive,	uninformed,	and	inadequately	trained	and	
supervised.”26	Practitioners	prove	insensitive	when	pressuring	their	patients	to	prematurely	“come	
out” and present themselves as a different gender before they are prepared to do so.27 Further, 
Mary	Parlee	found	that	traditional	counseling	methods	often	pathologize	people	who	embody	a	
nontraditional gender identity.28	Research	further	demonstrates	a	deep	“prevalence	of	clinician	
ignorance	and	insensitivity	to	transgender	issues,”	including	the	specific	struggles	faced	by	this	
population.29	Mental	health	practitioners	have	been	actively	offensive	when	engaging	with	parents	of	
gender-variant children. When practitioners focus on the etiology of transgender or gender-variant 
embodiments,	they	often	blame	parents	for	“causing”	nonnormative	behavior	or	embodiment.30 
	 Most	mental	health	practitioners	have	never	received	trainings	or	any	form	of	education	
related to sex and gender.31	In	a	qualitative	study,	Benson	found	that	transgender	patients	expressed	
concern with how little training their therapists had received on issues of transgender identity and 
gender more broadly. These patients felt therapists relied on them to teach them about transgender 
identity. Patients felt that they were paying for services and needed help, but were spending most 
of their sessions explaining basic concepts to the practitioner. These patients also expressed concern 
that practitioners did not understand the difference between sex and gender as concepts, leading to 
frustration	and	feelings	of	invalidation.	Patients	in	this	study	expressed	a	deep	desire	to	“dive	into	
the issues” and frustration with the inability to do so.32
25.	Association	of	Lesbian,	Gay,	Bisexual,	and	Transgender	Issues	in	Counseling,	Competencies for Counseling with 
Transgender Clients	(Alexandria,	VA:	Author,	2009).	
26.	Ibid.,	9.
27.	Patricia	Gagne	and	Richard	Tewksbury,	“Coming	Out	and	Crossing	Over:	Identity	Formation	and	Proclamation	in	a	
Transgender Community,” Gender & Society	11	(1997):	478–508.
28.	Mary	Parlee,	“Situated	Knowledges	of	Personal	Embodiment:	Transgender	Activists’	and	Psychological	Theorists’	
Perspectives	on	‘Sex’	and	‘Gender,’”	Theory and Psychology,	1996.
29.	Kristen	Benson,	“Seeking	Support:	Transgender	Client	Experiences	with	Mental	Health	Services,”	Journal of Feminist 
Family Therapy	25	(2013):	18;	Jillian	Shipherd,	Kelly	Green,	and	Sarah	Abramovitz,	“Transgender	Clients:	Identifying	and	
Minimizing	Barriers	to	Mental	Health	Treatment,” Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health	14,	no.	2	(2010):	94–108.
30.	Shirley	Emerson,	“Stages	of	Adjustment	in	Family	Members	of	Transgender	Individuals,”	Journal of Family Psychology 7, 
no.	3	(1996):	1–12.	
31.	Lev.	
32.	Benson.
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 The literature also suggests that mental health practitioners lack education and knowledge 
surrounding transgender identity, sex, and gender.33 Although multicultural education in counseling 
has worked to support understandings of race and ethnicity, specialized course work and formal 
trainings	are	significantly	lacking	for	LGBT	issues,	particularly	transgender	issues.34	Benson	asserted	
that	practitioners	who	lack	training	specific	to	gender	and	sex	issues	“unintentionally	reinforce	a	
socially sanctioned two-gender system,” even when well-intentioned.35 Even some practitioners 
who work primarily with transgender patients never receive training on sex and gender outside of 
a	“diagnostic	framework,”	which	may	explain	the	binary	framework	embraced	by	well-intentioned	
practitioners. 36 Few training opportunities and curricula related to sex and gender are available, and 
it is seldom mandatory for practitioners to attend.37	Magnet	and	Diamond	argue	that	when	personal	
biases	are	not	addressed	through	educational	apparatus,	there	is	risk	for	therapists	to	“push	their	
own	interpretations	about	clients’	lives	onto	their	clients,”	which	“may	serve	to	reinscribe	existing	
hierarchies and enact new traumas.”38 Thus, the paucity of competent gender education and training 
opportunities	can	have	clear	and	pressing	ramifications.	
CRITICAL FEMINIST PEDAGOGY
	 Barriers	between	a	practitioner	and	the	client	are	likely	to	be	easier	to	overcome	if	a	therapist	
has competence in addressing gender identity issues.39 What actions can be taken, however, to 
ensure that practitioners comprehend gender identity issues? The work of Derald Sue and colleagues 
indicates that graduate school curricula based in understandings of power, privilege, and oppression 
are a key means of transforming practitioner biases and judgments.40 To address gender injustice 
and	issues	on	gender	identity,	several	scholars	argue	that	self-evaluation	and	reflexivity	are	crucial;	
that is, future practitioners must evaluate the ways in which their personal experiences and 
33.	Rupert	Raj,	“Toward	a	Transpositive	Therapeutic	Model:	Developing	Clinical	Sensitivity	and	Cultural	Competence	in	
the Effective Support of Transsexual and Transgendered Clients,” International Journal of Transgenderism	6,	no.	2	(2002).
34.	S.	Cole,	Dallas	Denny,	Evan	Eyler,	and	Sandra	Samons,	“Issues	of	Transgender”	in	Psychological Perspectives in Human 
Sexuality	(New	York:	Wiley,	2000);	Ruth	Fassinger	and	Beth	Richie,	“Sex	Matters:	Gender	and	Sexual	Orientation	in	Training	
for	Multicultural	Counseling	Competency,”	in	Multicultural Counseling Competencies: Assessment, Education and Training, and 
Supervision,	eds.	D.B.	Pope-Davis	and	H.L.K.	Coleman	(Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Sage,	1996);	Derald	Sue,	Patricia	Arredondo,	
and	Roderick	McDavis,	“Multicultural	Counseling	Competencies	and	Standards:	A	Call	to	the	Profession,”	Journal of 
Counseling & Development	70	(1992):	477–86.		
35.	Benson,	18–19.
36. Ibid., 22.
37.	Ibid;	Christoph	Hanssmann,	Darius	Morrison,	and	Ellery	Russian,	“Talking,	Gawking,	or	Getting	It	Done:	Provider	
Trainings	to	Increase	Cultural	and	Clinical	Competence	for	Transgender	and	Gender-Nonconforming	Patients	and	Clients,”	
Sexuality Research & Social Policy	5,	no.	1	(2008):	5–23.
38.	ShoShana	Magnet	and	Shaindl	Diamond,	“Feminist	Pedagogy	Meets	Feminist	Therapy:	Teaching	Feminist	Therapy	in	
Women’s	Studies,”	Feminist Teacher	21,	no.	1	(2010):	25-6.
39.	Shipherd	et	al.	
40. Sue et al. 
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understanding of gender and sexuality are interconnected with larger cultural norms, stereotypes, 
and institutional forms of discrimination.41 
 Educators focused on sex and gender education/training challenge students in the classroom 
to look deeply into their own internal responses and attitudes toward transgender people. Educators 
encourage students to evaluate their discomfort with transgender and gender-variant people who 
challenge the traditional gender binary. Educators also encourage non-transgender practitioners to 
understand their own gender identity and how it was constructed, built, and supported throughout 
their lives.42	This	allows	for	a	relational	evaluation	between	one’s	own	gendered	experience	and	that	
of another. Through a feminist poststructuralist lens, Elizabeth Tisdell suggests that counselors and 
educators	must	“problematize	the	conditions	that	have	informed	their	own	lives.”43 In so doing, they 
become	more	competent,	informed,	and	reflexive	individuals	and	therapists.	
	 Many	educators	committed	to	strengthening	practitioner	ties	between	individual	awareness	
and	systemic	oppression	(which	can	then	be	translated	into	therapeutic	practice)	consider	their	strategy	
feminist.44	Practitioners	focused	on	creating	affirming	spaces	for	transgender	clients	believe	it	deeply	
important for a practitioner to understand the feminist principles of intersectionality, positionality, and 
deconstructionism. In their eyes, a practitioner must understand that when they come to therapy as 
a	practitioner,	they	are	entering	with	certain	“ways	of	seeing.”	That	is,	a	therapist	of	particular	social	
identities	(e.g.,	“white,”	“woman,”	“Jewish”)	will	be	shaped	by	these	identities,	including	the	ways	
those identities are treated and comprehended and how they function in personal life and society. A 
practitioner must be able to look deeply into their subjective experiences and understand how their 
experiences are different from those of patients of differing social identities.45	Beyond	this,	practitioners	
must	understand	interlocking	systems	of	power.	ALGBTIC	asserts	that	practitioners	must	comprehend	
how transgender oppression is built on the shoulders of sexism and homophobia.46
	 Tisdell	encourages	the	use	of	poststructural	“feminist	teachings”	in	the	classroom	to	shift	
and expand practitioner understandings of gender.47 She advocates exploring the teachings of the 
construction	of	“truth”	and	a	notion	of	“constantly	shifting	identities”	that	are	not	grounded	in	stable	
41.	Association	of	Lesbian,	Gay,	Bisexual,	and	Transgender	Issues	in	Counseling, Competencies for Counseling with Transgender 
Clients, Journal of LGBT Issues in Counseling	4,	no.	3-4	(2010):	135–59	[hereafter	“Association”];	Benson;	Lynn	Carroll	and	
Paula	Gilroy,	“Transgender	Issues	in	Counselor	Preparation,”	Counselor Education & Supervision	41	(2002):	233–42;	Elizabeth	
Tisdell,	“Poststructuralist	Feminist	Pedagogies:	The	Possibilities	and	Limitations	of	Feminist	Emancipatory	Adult	Learning	
Theory and Practice,” Adult Education Quarterly	48,	no.	3	(1998):	139–56.
42.	Association;	Carroll	and	Gilroy.
43.	Elizabeth	Ellsworth,	“Why	Doesn’t	This	Feel	Empowering?	Working	through	the	Repressive	Myths	of	Critical	
Pedagogy,” Harvard Educational Review	59,	no.	3	(1989):	297–323;	Tisdell,	153.
44.	Magnet	and	Diamond;	Tisdell.
45.	Linda	Alcoff,	“Cultural	Feminism	versus	Poststructuralism:	The	Identity	Crisis	in	Feminist	Theory,”	Signs 13, no. 3 
(1988):	405–36;	Kimberle	Crenshaw,	“Mapping	the	Margins:	Intersectionality,	Identity	Politics,	and	Violence	against	Women	
of Color,” Stanford Law Review	43,	no.	6	(1991):	1241–99;	Tisdell,	153.
46. Association.
47.	Tisdell,	153.
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identity formations as well as deconstructing gender and larger categorical binaries and examining 
the social construction of their lives.48 She explains the effects of such teachings:
If one has embraced societal prescriptions of particular gender roles (or race roles or sexual 
roles that are exclusively heterosexual), and one becomes conscious of and examines the social 
construction of such roles, one’s identity is likely to shift and one could develop new ways of 
acting in the world.49
Tisdell captures the radical transformational possibilities in a poststructuralist feminist education that 
allows practitioners to see in new ways: to understand how power, stereotypes, and norms inform 
their reality. When seeing clearly, they can begin to undo social prescriptions and form new ways 
of being and engaging in the world. These values of looking deeply and analyzing sites of societal 
inscription	can	then	enter	into	the	therapeutic	sphere.	This	work	of	“looking	deeply”	is	considered	
“emotional	work.”	It	requires	substantial	effort	and	can	often	raise	traumatic	experiences	around	
gender, sexual, and racial abuse. Done mindfully, however, this education can lead to a crucial and 
transformatory	“feminist	consciousness.”50
	 Some	educators	find	it	important	to	teach	students	about	the	history	of	the	DSM	and	its	
effects on transgender people.51	ALGBTIC	encourages	practitioners	to	understand	the	historically	
inadequate training and education provided to practitioners, and how such inattention to 
transgender	persons’	existences	and	experiences	vis-à-vis	training	has	compounded	the	
discrimination	this	population	faces.	ALGBTIC	emphasizes	the	need	for	practitioners	to	understand	
the	DSM’s	history	of	heterosexism	and	gender	bias	and	encourages	practitioners	to	“acknowledge	
and address the gatekeeper role and subsequent power that mental health professionals have 
historically had.”52 Overall, if practitioners can understand the problematic historical relationship 
between	the	DSM,	mental	health	practitioners,	and	transgender	patients,	this	may	help	enhance	the	
practitioner-patient relationship because the practitioner will better comprehend the fears, social 
context,	and	historical	discrimination	underlying	a	patient’s	experience.	
 Educators can take concrete steps to help their students understand transgender identity 
and	the	struggles	transgender	people	face.	Carroll	and	Gilroy	recommend	inviting	guest	panels	of	
transgender advocates into the classroom to help students better comprehend the cultural struggles 
faced by transgender people.53	Members	of	ALGBTIC	argue	that	lessons	devoted	to	the	institutional	
discrimination faced by transgender people should be mandatory, including discrimination in health 
care, policing, and schools.54	By	focusing	on	institutional	discrimination,	practitioners	can	begin	to	
48. Ibid.
49.	Ibid.,	146.
50.	Magnet	and	Diamond.
51.	Association;	Carroll	and	Gilroy.	
52.	Association,	148.
53.	Carroll	and	Gilroy.	
54.	Association.
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understand transgender mental health concerns as arising forcefully from societal treatment rather 
than from an assumed space of innate pathology.55	Carroll	and	Gilroy	believe	it	important	to	actively	
challenge	binary	constructions	of	gender.	As	they	state,	“Discussions	about	the	nature	of	gender	
identity need to be integrated throughout course work rather than marginalized in the context of 
one course.”56	Finally,	educators	find	it	helpful	to	familiarize	students	with	significant	historical	
and political events that helped shape the transgender movement.57 This further evidence of the 
struggles, traumas, and efforts of transgender people and their allies provides additional context and 
understanding for the practitioner in therapy. 
Study Methodology
 This research project examines the conceptions of gender held by medical and mental health 
practitioners.	I	conducted	15	semi-structured,	in-depth	interviews	over	three	months	that	shed	
light on the intricate and multilayered ways in which mental health practitioners conceptualize and 
engage with transgender identity.58 Prior to my interviews, these practitioners had not been asked 
about	how	they	conceptualize	transgender	identity,	especially	in	relation	to	the	new	DSM	gender	
dysphoria diagnosis. 
 I designed the interviews to challenge both myself and practitioners to speak to a myriad 
of gendered concepts in unique and situational ways. The interviews demonstrate that a single 
practitioner	can	embody	and	promote	diverse	conceptualizations	of	transgender	identity.	My	
analysis	of	the	interviews	also	explores	how	practitioners’	prior	education,	research,	and	life	
experiences	shape	their	approach	to	therapeutic	work.	The	final	section	of	this	paper	explores	
possible interventions for gender liberation in the therapeutic sphere. 
 While the study participants vary in occupation, all are licensed therapists, psychologists, 
and/or psychiatrists. Seven have extensive experience working with transgender patients in private 
practice;	two	respondents	have	some	experience	working	with	transgender	patients;	and	six	have	no	
such experience.59 
	 The	first	overriding	theme	in	this	study	is	the	level	of	experience	practitioners	have	working	
with	transgender	patients	in	a	clinical	setting.	Experience	is	broken	into	three	types:	1)	practitioners	
55.	S.	Rostosky,	“Same-Sex	Couple	Perceptions	of	Family	Support:	A	Consensual	Qualitative	Study,”	Family Process 43 
(2004):	4357.
56.	Carroll	and	Gilroy,	235.
57.		Ibid.
58.	Interview	respondents	were	contacted	by	phone	or	email.	The	interviews	lasted	30	to	80	minutes.	All	respondents	consented	
to having their interviews audio-recorded and spoke under informed consent. This study includes no identifying information. 
Throughout	this	paper,	individual	interview	participants	are	referred	to	with	the	gender-neutral	“them”	and	“they.”		
59.		Six	interviews	occurred	in	Los	Angeles.	All	of	those	interviews	took	place	with	participants	who	have	extensive	
experience working with transgender patients. I located most of these respondents using a snowball methodology and 
online	resources	via	LGBT	centers,	resource	pages	for	transgender	persons,	and	individual	blogs.	The	other	nine	interviews	
took	place	in	New	York.	Six	of	these	participants	had	no	experience	working	with	transgender	patients,	two	respondents	
had some experience, and the remaining respondent worked extensively with transgender patients. I located most 
respondents using a snowball methodology. 
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with extensive	experience	work	almost	exclusively	with	transgender	or	gender-variant	patients;	2)	
practitioners with some	experience	have	only	worked	with	one	transgender	or	gender-variant	patient;	
and	3)	practitioners	with	no experience have never worked with transgender or gender-variant 
patients in clinical practice.60 
 During the interviews and subsequent analysis, feminist teachings emerged as a second 
overriding theme.61	I	coded	parts	of	the	interview	as	referring	to	feminist	teachings	if	they	(1)	
deconstructed	the	binary	between	“male”	and	“female,”	or	“man”	and	“woman”;	(2)	challenged	
respondents	to	(re)evaluate	their	understandings	of	gender	and	to	consider	how	dominant	notions	
of	gender	might	impact	their	work;	(3)	centered	on	the	socialization	of	gender	identity;	or	(4)	
incorporated	the	word	“feminism”	when	explaining	a	shift	in	essentialist	gender	politics.62
 This study focuses on three emergent themes: essentialism, agential identity, and social 
constructionism. Statements around gender identity were considered essentialist if they discussed 
gender	identity	as	binary,	fixed,	a	bodily	phenomenon,	an	internal	phenomenon,	resembling	a	“born	
in the wrong body” narrative, or consisting of an internal, true, felt sense of gender. Statements were 
coded as agential identity if they discussed gender identity as an individual freedom of expression 
and choice, multiple identities, and agency, but failed to mention relationality and sociality. 
Statements were coded social constructionist	if	they	discussed	gender	identity	as	fluid,	affected	by	
outside	influences,	relationally	defined,	or	universally	felt	(that	is,	gender	identity	is	something	both	
transgender	people	and	non-transgender	people	negotiate).
	 This	study	has	several	limitations.	First,	eight	of	the	nine	participants	in	the	New	York	
interviews knew me or my family personally. While the interviews were rich in content, the 
connection between the respondent and me could have affected the interview. Second, a consistent 
interview protocol was not used throughout this study. While some respondents were asked about 
the social construction of sex, others were not. As the interview process progressed, I realized that the 
social construction of sex was a relevant and noteworthy subject of exploration. Unfortunately, this 
area	of	study	was	not	covered	in	the	first	eight	interviews.	Third,	my	findings	cannot	be	generalized.	
Beyond	the	small	sample	size,	these	practitioners	are	almost	all	white,	work	in	mostly	affluent	areas,	
and come from distinct educational degree programs.
60. It is important to distinguish between some and no experience, for working with even one transgender patient could 
drastically	inform	and	shift	a	practitioner’s	understanding	and	conceptualization	of	transgender	identity.	
61. Though not addressed in the literature review, naming something as a feminist philosophy can be dangerous in the 
tendency to both whiten feminism and homogenize a historically complex concept. Feminism, after all, experienced 
three	major	waves	in	US	history;	between	the	second	and	third	waves	existed	major	debates	and	discrepancies	in	how	to	
advocate	for	the	rights	of	all	women	(i.e.,	queer	women,	women	of	color,	trans	women).	
62.	Coding	is	defined	as,	“A	systematic	way	in	which	to	condense	extensive	data	sets	into	smaller	analyzable	units	through	
the	creation	of	categories	and	concepts	derived	from	the	data.”	This	definition	is	drawn	from	Sharon	Lockyer,	“Coding	
Qualitative Data,” The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods,	vol.	1,	ed.	Michael	S.	Lewis-Beck,	Alan	Bryman,	
and	Timothy	Futing	Liao	(Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Sage,	2004),	137–38.
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The Heterogeneity of Essentialism
	 While	the	category	of	essentialism	is	firmly	grounded	in	identity	stability,	biology,	hormones,	
and	the	bodily	and	psychical	realness	or	naturalness	of	one’s	gender	identity,	I	found	that	specific	
manifestations	of	essentialist	discourse	exist	beyond	these	common	themes.	A	total	of	35	comments	
were coded as essentialist, 26 of which were articulated by practitioners with no experience working 
with transgender patients, seven by practitioners with some experience, and two by practitioners 
with	extensive	experience.	Strikingly,	of	the	35	remarks,	33	came	from	practitioners	without	
“feminist	teachings.”	Within	the	general	topic	of	essentialism,	five	subthemes	emerged:	(1)	binary	
conceptualizations,	(2)	the	holistic	narrative,	(3)	the	conflating	of	sex,	gender	identity,	and	sexual	
orientation,	(4)	the	naturalness	of	transgender	identity,	and	(5)	the	nonbinary	essentialist	position.
ESSENTIALISM THROUGH BINARY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
 When coding a statement as a binary conception of transgender identity, I required that it 
include	one	of	the	following:	(1)	the	sole	mention	of	“man”	to	“woman”	or	vice	versa;	(2)	the	sole	
mention	of	“female”	to	“male”	or	vice	versa;	(3)	the	mention	of	“opposite”	gender	categories;	or	(4)	
the failure to mention alternative gender categories. Seven statements fell within these criteria and 
were only offered by respondents with either no or some experience and with no feminist teachings.63
	 This	conceptualization	requires	someone	to	go	from	“boy”	to	“girl,”	thereby	remaining	within	
a binary framework. For example, the following remark presents a binary conception of transgender 
identity:	“And	so	I	think	if	somebody’s	born	a	boy	and	wants	to	have	a	sex	change	operation,	it’s	
because they see themself as a girl.”64 This comment suggests that to go from one gender to the other 
means to both identify	as	the	“other”	gender	and	to live as	the	“other”	gender.	It	requires,	then,	an	
internal	sense	of	identification	as	purely	one	gender	and	an	actualization	of	that	gender	identity	
affirmed	by	a	material/corporeal	transition.	
	 Respondent	5	encapsulated	this	dual	process:	“And	so	some	people,	from	my	
understanding,	they’re	born	male	but	they	identify	as	female	and	so	they	present	themselves	
as	female.”	In	other	words,	one	must	first	identify	purely	as	the	opposite	sex—one	must	have	a	
sense	that	the	body	to	which	they	were	born	to	(in	this	example,	a	normative	“male”	body)	is	not	
in line with their conceptualization of themselves as psychically65 or corporeally66	“female.”	This	
incongruent	identification	necessitates	a	transition	whereby	one	can	or	must	present oneself as one 
sees	oneself:	One	must	find	a	way	to	make	congruent	that	“deep”	internal	sense	of	gender	with	
63.	Note	that	coding	statements	into	particular	classifications	can	sometimes	be	a	dangerous	or	misleading	effort,	for	one	
given statement can bleed into several categories and often contradict conceptualizations offered earlier in the interview. It 
is critical to keep these intricacies in mind throughout the paper, namely, that to code a singular statement into one category 
is	never	a	definite,	objective,	or	removed	process.	
64.	Respondent	7;	Respondent	3	offered	a	similar	binarized	remark:	“I	mean,	I	guess	it’s	not	just	identifying,	more	it’s,	
you	know,	living	that	way	in	some	way,	I	guess...	Living	as	a	woman	if	you’re	a	man	or	a	man	if	you’re	a	woman.”	Here,	
Respondent 3 understands transgender embodiment purely in dualistic terms—to go from one gender to the other.
65.		The	feeling	that	comes	from	within	one’s	body—one’s	spiritual,	internal	sense	“of	being”	a	given	gender.	
66.	One’s	dress	or	expected/desired	presentation	of	one’s	physical	body.
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a particular corporeal presentation and embodiment. A question raised here is what exactly it 
means	or	looks	like	to	present	oneself	as	“female.”	For,	in	this	conceptualization,	the	requirement	
is not to present oneself as one sees oneself,	but	purely	to	present	oneself	as	“female.”	This	suggests	
a transformation is required, either through surgical means or by dominant social standards. A 
person’s	exterior	gender	must	match	the	vision	of	the	internal	gender.	It	will	not	suffice	to	believe	
in	an	internal	(“male”)	gender	identity	while	still	presenting	or	being	socially	comprehended	
as	either	“male”	or	“non-female.”	Thus,	under	this	binary,	congruent/incongruent	framework,	
physical alterations are required. 
A HOLISTIC, AUTHENTIC, STABLE NARRATIVE
 Part of what transpires in essentialist frameworks is a certain script, usually revolving around 
dominant	notions	of	transgender	identity	(i.e.,	binary	identity,	biological).67 This phenomenon is 
strongly present in my research: The script is one that relies on all of the elements already explored 
and	requires	a	transgender	person	to	pursue	either	(1)	a	holistic	narrative,	(2)	a	stable	identity	
through	time,	or	(3)	legal	changes.	Without	one	of	these	elements,	the	subject	is	incomprehensible,	
either	socially	or	within	the	medical	sphere,	leading	to	possible	non-affirming	treatment	and	lack	of	
access to medical needs and support.68 Five statements were coded under these three criteria, and all 
statements were made by respondents with no experience working with transgender patients. 
	 In	order	to	exist	as	a	comprehensible	subject—and	therefore	be	qualified	for	surgical	and	
hormonal	treatments	and	met	with	a	practitioner’s	understanding	and	support—a	transgender	
person must maintain a narrative of wholeness in which surgery and hormonal treatments function 
as a means of transforming incongruence into congruence, emptiness into full being. Respondent 2 
reflected	the	concept	that	when	emptiness	exists,	life	is	unlivable:	
It’d be like if one’s setting a table, a proper table, well if you don’t put the spoons there, you 
can’t have the soup. It’s not just the knife and the fork; you need the spoons there too. That’s 
the proper table setting. And that’s how I think the individual would perceive him or herself. 
No, now I am whole. Now I am as I see myself. Before there was something not in cohesion 
with how I saw myself.
Respondent 2 conceptualizes transgender identity as an incompleteness in which one cannot see oneself 
fully	because	the	“proper”	makeup	of	that	table	setting—the	person’s	internal	and	external	sense	of	
self—is not in congruence. A position based in the necessity of making the incongruent congruent is 
essentialist,	for	it	requires	an	individual	to	transition	from	one	way	of	being	(nonnormative)	to	another	
(normative).	Beyond	this,	though,	Respondent	2’s	statement	evokes	essentialism	in	the	expectation	that	
“fullness”	or	“wholeness”	can	be	finally,	ultimately,	stably	achieved	given	changes	in	certain	conditions.	
The desire to feel more comfortable with oneself is not in itself essentialist. Essentialism is embodied 
in the premise that once certain conditions or changes to the body are met, then a	person’s	complete,	
internal sense of identity and fullness can exist in perpetuity. 
67.	Lev;	Spade.
68. Spade.
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	 Like	Respondent	2,	Respondent	5	suggested	an	“authentic”	transgender	narrative	of	rightful	
intent, meaning a person who is transitioning their body via hormones or surgery because they have 
a deep internal need to transform something in themselves. The narrative they are sharing with the 
world is representative of that internal gender identity–based struggle.69 Simply put, a person is 
transitioning	“for	the	right	reasons”:	reasons	that	are	believable,	recognizable,	and	understandable	
for	the	pain	and	distress	they	cause.	During	the	interview,	Respondent	5	made	a	point	to	distinguish	
between	two	types	of	people:	those	who	are	“transgendering”	themselves	for	attention	and	those	
who	are	“transitioning”	for	authentic	and	legitimate	reasons.	Respondent	5	described	a	student	who	
changes	their	dress	and	sexual	partners	(“man”	one	week,	“woman”	another)	from	week-to-week:	
“Well,	it’s	not	like	a	pair	of	clothes	that	you,	a	coat	that	you	just	change	from	day-to-day.	So	I	think	
sometimes	they	don’t	even	realize	it	themselves	that	what	they’re	saying	is	completely	false.	I	don’t	
believe that somebody changes their identity from week-to-week, you know?”
	 Respondent	5’s	remarks	are	striking	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	young	adult’s	experience	
of	shifting	presentation	and	sexual	partners	is	called	“completely	false.”	Second,	Respondent	5	
clearly	believes	in	an	authentic	identity	that	is	stable	and	lacking	fluidity.	Using	Respondent	5’s	
conceptualization,	it	would	be	difficult	to	understand	a	transgender	student	who	believes	in	the	
fluidity	of	their	identity	because	gender	identity	or	sexual	orientation	are	stable,	unchanging	entities.	
	 Respondent	5’s	essentialist	position	on	identity	formation	marks	certain	narratives	as	real	
and	others	as	questionable.	Later	Respondent	5	described	a	person	they	worked	with	in	a	nonclinical	
setting	as	being	authentic	or	genuine:	“And	that	was	everything	from	changing	their	dress	and	how	
they present themselves for a period of time to getting hormonal treatment and eventually looking 
forward to ... reassignment surgery—basically having a sex change operation .... And going through 
that whole process. It just seemed genuine to me.” The respondent suggested that an authentic and 
genuine	expression	of	transgender	identity	requires	a	particular	narrative	in	which	a	person	first	
changes their dress, presents themselves as the opposite gender, and then receives hormonal and 
sex reassignment surgery to complete this process of full transformation.70	When	these	specific	steps	
are taken and when a narrative by both the trans person and therapist is endorsed, then acceptance 
and	genuinity	become	possible	(from	access	to	a	driver’s	license,	to	using	the	bathroom	of	one’s	
needs,	to	receiving	medical	treatments,	to	feeling	safe	and	validated	by	one’s	peers	and	oneself).71 
This	expectation	raises	serious	concerns,	however,	about	the	need	to	fulfill	particular,	narrow	
69.	Such	a	notion	is	illustrated	in	Dean	Spade’s	work,	“Resisting	Medicine,	Re/Modeling	Gender.”	Though	Spade	speaks	
less	about	a	transgender	person’s	experience	sharing	their	narrative	with	family	and	other	members	of	society,	he	addresses	
the requirement of a transgender person to articulate a pain-based narrative in the clinical sphere. According to Spade, a 
transgender	person’s	story	is	more	believable	when	it	follows	a	particular	discourse	on	pain	and	internal	incongruence.	
When	such	a	narrative	is	articulated,	one	is	then	eligible	for	“treatment,”	as	it	would	then	be	necessary	to	alleviate	that	pain	
and suffering. 
70.	Legal	changes	can	be	included	in	the	necessary	steps	of	transitioning.	As	Respondent	3	remarked,	“If	you	really	change	
your name, change your sex ... and then if you apply for a job, you apply for a job in that sex and really see yourself. I 
mean	changing	one’s	name	I	think	would	be	a	big	one.”	Therefore,	a	“real”	transgender	narrative	requires	both	a	personal	
transformation as well as legitimizing that transformation through state and economic powers.
71.	Butler,	Undoing Gender;	Lev;	Spade.
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embodiments of gender identity. Such a model deeply limits the ways in which a transgender person 
can	articulate	their	identity;	to	identify	or	state	their	identity	differently	could	jeopardize	access	to	
needed treatments. 
THE CONFLATING OF SEXUAL CHARACTERISTICS, GENDER IDENTITY,  
AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
 Often, an essentialist conceptualization of transgender identity carries within it certain 
expectations and presumptions about how a transgender individual will/should express themself.72 
Those	expectations	manifest	by	conflating	one’s	sexual	characteristics	with	gender	expression	(as	
it	is	dominantly	understood)	as	well	as	with	one’s	sexual	orientation	or	expression	of	sexual	acts	
in	the	private	realm.	During	the	interviews,	remarks	that	a	person	presents	oneself	as	“female”	
come with several assumptions about the way that person will express themselves sexually or 
physically	(by	dress).	Statements	that	fall	into	this	category	of	conflation meet at least one of the 
following	criteria:	(1)	assumptions	about	the	sexual	role	in	the	private	sphere,	(2)	assumptions	of	
dominance	or	submission	in	the	private	sphere,	(3)	assumptions	about	physical	dress	and	particular	
gendered	embodiment,	or	(4)	assumptions	of	bodily	transition	in	order	to	achieve	a	particular	
normative gender identity. Six responses were coded under this category, all of which were made by 
practitioners with some or no experience working with transgender patients. 
	 Practitioners	in	this	study	conflated	sexual	and	gender	identity	within	the	personal	and	
private	spheres	by	insisting	on	taking	one	identity	(say,	a	person	who	identifies	as	“female”)	and	
associating that identity with a particular gender phenomenon or set of normative acts/behaviors. 
For example, Respondent 2 said the following: 
As I would understand the transgendered person, no! It goes much deeper than just the person 
who was once born as Frank [change of name for discretion] going to shop at Lauren’s [change 
of name for location discretion] or any well-known store that was for women and buying 
clothing. No this goes to how they live. You would go in their apartment or where they live. 
It’s decorated, and I hate to use this gender term, but as a woman would decorate her home.
Respondent 2 argued, on the one hand, that being transgender means going beyond physical dress, 
but	on	the	other,	argued	that	a	person’s	home	is	indicative	of	their	internal	sense	of	gender.	While	the	
former	act	(shopping)	is	optional,	the	second	act	(the	home)	is	a	seemingly	true	or	genuine	indicator	
72. Ibid. For example, Spade says that transgender people are expected to advance a very particular, narrow narrative 
of themselves that requires them to align more with normative, essentialist transgender conceptualizations than with 
alternative	understandings.	Spade	explains,	“I	learned	quickly	that	to	achieve	that	embodiment,	I	needed	to	perform	a	
desire	for	gender	normativity,	to	convince	the	doctors	that	I	suffered	from	GID	and	wanted	to	‘be’	a	‘man’	in	a	narrow	sense	
of	both	words.	My	quest	for	body	alteration	had	to	be	legitimized	by	a	medical	reference	to,	and	pretended	belief	in,	a	
binary	gender	system	that	I	had	been	working	to	dismantle	since	adolescence”	(p.	26).
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of	one’s	identity	as	a	“woman.”73 However, both acts rely on a constructed understanding of what 
those spaces signify. The notion that the way a person decorates their home is indicative of their 
gender	identity	fits	strongly	into	an	essentialist	framework,	for	it	assumes	something	stable	in	how	a	
“woman”	(any	“woman”)	would	embody	that	space.	It	speaks	not	to	the	“woman”	as	her	own	being,	
but	more	to	the	“woman”	as	encapsulating	simply	how “women” are by their very nature. 
	 However,	defining	the	way	“women”	are	by	their	very	nature	means	equating	“woman”	
with	“feminine”	characteristics	and	“man”	with	“masculine”	characteristics.	These	gendered	
assumptions	based	on	sex	lay	the	foundation	for	conflations	surrounding	sexual	orientation	and	
actions/embodiment within the private sphere. For example, within this framework, a mental health 
practitioner	would	expect	a	heterosexual	transgender	“woman”	to	be	“submissive”	in	a	heterosexual	
sexual	partnership.	When	that	transgender	“woman”	is	not	submissive,	this	causes	confusion	and	
extended exploration by the practitioner. This explorative and confounding process commences 
because	the	gender	embodiment	of	the	patient	runs	in	opposition	to	that	practitioner’s	normative	
notions	of	gender	and	sex	(including	the	acts,	behaviors,	and	affects	associated	with	“woman”	or	
“female”).	The	dissonance	between	gender	embodiment	and	gender	identity	ultimately	concerns	the	
practitioner, causing them to question the patient at length. 
	 Because	of	gender	and	sexual	norms	and	expectations—and	narratives	that	run	counter	to	
such norms in therapy—a practitioner comes to believe that the patient has an innate dysphoria. For 
example, Respondent 2 gave the following description of sexual actions between a cisgender man 
(their	patient)	and	a	pre-operative	transgender	woman:	
What does come up is in sexual intimacy, how the transgendered individual can often be 
the dominant person in bed and not simply the passive person. And that’s always a subject 
to be explored. Because the presentation of the patient might be that they’re very extremely 
masculine very well built. And yet in intimacy with a transgendered individual, they can be 
the passive, receptive partner. So those issues do come up.
Respondent	2’s	remark	captures	several	common	assumptions	and	conflations.	First,	it	assumes	
that	a	cisgender,	“extremely	masculine	very	well	built”	“man”	would	normally	be	the	dominant,	
penetrative partner. Second, it assumes that for him not	to	desire	to	be	the	“dominant”	partner	is	
something to be explored rather than something to be accepted without concern. Third, it assumes 
that	the	transgender	“woman”	is	the	“passive,	receptive	partner”	and	thereby	embodies	a	normative	
73.	Strikingly,	while	Respondent	2’s	statement	appears	to	not	require	a	change	in	clothing	or	dress	for	the	transgender	
person, other statements clearly indicate that such gender expressions are a requirement. Take, for example, the following 
remark:	“Certainly,	to	demasculine	the	physical	house	in	which	Larry	[name	changed	for	discretion]	lives.	The	day-to-day	
house,	to	demasculine	it.	By	that	would	be	to	grow	longer	hair,	to	have	the	minimum	of	facial	hair,	or	even	by—and	body	
hair.	To	definitely	want	to	have	clothing	which	would	assist	this	person	in	living	as	the	opposite	gender.	Dresses,	skirts,	
heels, bags, make-up. That would just be the outer.” Exterior aspects of the person, in this conceptualization, are clearly 
correlated	with	the	person’s	internal	sense	of	self	as	either	internally	feminine	or	masculine.	Further,	dominant	notions	of	
femininity—make-up, dress, no body hair, heels—are explicitly named in correlation with how they must see themselves. 
This conceptualization, then, instills certain ways of being onto what that transgender person should or should not be 
doing. Ultimately, the physical is a representation of the psychical and internal. 
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“female”	role	within	the	bedroom	rather	than	some	alternative	role	or	embodiment.74 The statement, 
therefore,	conflates	one’s	sexual	identity	(“male,”	“female”)	with	sexual	acts	associated	with	
particular gender identities. 
 This method of centering on the so-called issue of masculine receptivity raises concerns 
about the ways in which Respondent 2, and practitioners more generally, use assumptions 
and	standards	of	masculinity	and	dominance	(and	femininity	and	subordination)	to	analyze,	
comprehend, and assist their patients. The practitioner seems to use their understanding of gender 
(“man”=dominant,	“woman”=submissive)	as	the	basis	for	engaging	with	the	patient;	in	this	case,	
such	conceptualizations	of	gender	place	increased	attention	on	the	patient’s	sexual	behavior	and	
partner, casting such sexual and gender embodiments as outside normality. Thus, even in a moment 
of	compassionate	“exploration,”	gender	is	being	spoken	of	in	a	normative,	limiting,	and	perhaps	
damaging way. 
	 In	the	interviews,	a	final	conflation	was	apparent	between	sex,	gender	identity,	and	sexual	
orientation	among	queer-identified	people.	For	some	respondents,	homosexuality	was	seen	as	the	
first	step	toward	becoming	transgender	via	surgical	means.	For	instance,	Respondent	8	indicated	that	
the	only	difference	between	a	“homosexual”	and	a	transgender	person	is	that	the	transgender	person	
desires	hormonal	or	surgical	treatments.	However,	what	these	two	groups	(which	Respondent	8	
considered	mutually	exclusive	groups)	have	in	common	is	their	switching	from	one	binary	form	of	
sexual	expression	to	the	other	(i.e.,	passive	to	dominant).	In	this	conceptualization,	homosexuals	are	
transgender in their psychical and physical embodiment, but not in their material desire or need to 
attain surgery or hormones. Respondent 8 said the following:
[On a psychical level] More where someone is seeing him or herself more as a male within 
themselves or a female within themselves. In terms of the homosexuality piece, on the female 
side, someone that’s in a relationship but wants to be not just a dominant partner but wants 
to be the one that might be strapping on in terms of sexual relationships. Wants to almost feel 
penile-possessed as they’re with a lover or partner because of it.
Respondent	8’s	remarks	capture	how	a	homosexual	“woman”	is	psychically	a	(transgender)	
“man”	due	to	her	desire	for	“penile-possession”	with	her	partner.	That	penile-possession	becomes	
actualized through her need to not just to be a dominant partner throughout the relationship 
(a	dominantly	masculine	trait)	but	to	actually	possess	a	real	penis	in	bed,	including	the	power,	
possession, and penetration that comes with this device. The respondent misguidedly includes 
queer, non-transgender women into the formulation of transgender identity within this essentialist 
conceptualization.	This	finding	may	have	implications	for	the	misinformed	and	non-affirming	
treatment of queer and transgender patients. 
74.	For	an	alternative	reading	of	“submission”	and	“reception”	in	the	lesbian	sexual	sphere,	see	Ann	Cvetkovich,	An Archive 
of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures	(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2003).
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THE NATURALNESS OF TRANSGENDER IDENTITY
	 Essentialist	frameworks	for	conceptualizing	transgender	identity	flourish	due	to	the	
advancement of a naturalizing and biological discourse.75 A naturalizing discourse is one that does 
the	following:	(1)	treats	the	existence	of	transgender	people	as	part	of	a	process	of	human	evolution	
and	natural	human	variation,	(2)	understands	transgender	identity	to	arise	due	to	hormonal	or	
biological	differences,	or	(3)	believes	transgender	identity	to	be	something	that	is	“just	there,”	
something to which one is just born. In general, this discourse is centered on an incongruence 
between the gender you understand yourself to be and the one to which you were assigned at 
birth. Seven excerpts were coded as following a naturalizing discourse and were articulated by 
practitioners with no, some, and extensive experience working with transgender patients.  
	 Transgender	identity	is	often	explained	through	a	“born	that	way”	framework.	For	example,	
Respondent	12	stated,	“[Transgender	identity	is]	probably	just	something	that’s	there,	the	same	way	
that	for	other	people	it’s	there	the	other	way.	I	don’t	think	of	it	as	happening	in	their	life	that	makes	
that	develop.	I	think	it’s	something	that’s	just,	it’s	part	of	you.”76 This remark explains transgender 
identity as stemming from an innate source, intentionally separating identity formation from the 
social realm. Thus, Respondent 12 believes that transgender identity is not something that develops 
or is a product of environmental, societal, or cultural forces, but is rather an identity within oneself. 
 Critically, this naturalization of transgender identity can often be grounded in negative or 
disempowering	terms.	For	example,	in	this	framework,	one	is	a	product	of	one’s	body,	meaning	
that a person is considered transgender due to a lack of autonomy or agency over their corporeal 
person: An incongruence exists in themselves that they cannot help but experience, and they can do 
nothing	except	address	such	“dysphoria”	retroactively.	Importantly,	in	this	very	conceptualization,	
to be a product of something or someone also means being subject to that force. This phenomenon is 
reflected	in	Respondent	8’s	description	of	a	transgender	person’s	pursuit	of	surgery:	“I	think	I	see	it	
initially	as	a	process	that	would	make	sense	to	go	through.	Like	Mother	Nature	kind	of	fouled	things	
up	and	here’s	someone	working	to	correct	it.”	The	idea	that	Mother	Nature	“fouled	things	up”	places	
transgender identity in the negative realm, suggesting that transgender identity is nonnormative and 
must	be	fixed	through	surgical	means	in	order	to	right	a	wrong.	Respondent	5’s	remark	that	“you’re	
not	comfortable	in	your	own	skin	because	you	were	kind	of	given	something	that	doesn’t	match”	
mirrors this ideological position by failing to account for a possible agency, positivity, and 
75.	Spade.
76.	Like	Respondent	12,	Respondent	7	believes	that	transgender	identity	is	biological	and	existing	prior	to	socialization:	“I	
believe	there	is	something	biological...See	with	transgender	I	think	that	there	was	something	that	was	there,	that	there’s	a	
physical,	you	know,	honing	acted	upon	by	hormones	and	all	kinds	of	things.	I	don’t	see	that	as	something	that’s,	that	the	
environment created.” 
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empowerment. Thus, this type of essentialist framework based in the naturalization of transgender 
identity should be viewed with caution.77
NONBINARY ESSENTIALIST POSITION
	 The	final	subtheme	within	an	essentialist	framework	is	the	nonbinary	but	essentialist	
position. This viewpoint appears to endorse transgender identity as existing on a spectrum and thus 
in a social constructionist framework, while being grounded in essentialist words and principles. 
Comments that fall under this subtheme involve the words spectrum, continuum, ranges, or themes but 
use constructed terms like masculinity, femininity, levels, and of being to make their claim. Practitioners 
relationally	use	both	sets	of	terms	because	they	believe	these	gender	markers	are	real	or	intrinsic;	
that is, under a nonbinary essentialist framework, masculinity and femininity are naturally occurring 
phenomena that exist as part of human variation and diversity. Four statements fall under this 
criteria: Three were made by practitioners with no experience, and one was made by a practitioner 
with extensive experience working with transgender patients.
 Some respondents advanced the idea that transgender identity exists on a spectrum and 
that individuals fall along that spectrum. However, these spectrum positions are marked by 
“different	levels	of	what	might	seem	feminine	or	different	levels	of	what	might	seem	masculine.”78 
These	“different	levels”	of	femininity	and	masculinity	seem	to	take	place	within	the	hormonal	or	
biological sphere. In other words, these practitioners believe that masculinity and femininity are 
not constructed but are real categories that exist within each individual, resulting in a diversity of 
experiences along a spectrum. 
 In addition, there is the notion of transgender identity as existing beyond the binary while 
still maintaining a stable identity framework. For example, Respondent 14 explained transgender 
identity	as	follows:	“Someone	who’s	deep	personal	sense	of	themselves	in	regard	to	gender	is	
something apart from the usual binary conceptions of gender.... Their sense of their gendered 
self—or their deep personal feeling of being male, female, or other—is different from a gender 
that was assigned at birth.” Clearly, Respondent 14, who works extensively with transgender or 
gender-variant	patients,	believed	that	transgender	identity	can	exist	beyond	the	binary	of	“man”	
and	“woman.”	However,	their	inclusion	of	the	phrase	“of being	male,	female,	or	other”	[author’s	
emphasis] implies a deep sense of identity stability. Transgender identity exists as something one 
“has”	or	“is”	in	their	very	being,	not	something	one	continuously	becomes.	In	this	sense,	a	nonbinary	
77. Importantly, not all statements that fall under this discourse are disempowering. Respondent 11, who has extensive 
experience working with transgender patients, explained transgender identity through the language of human variation 
and	evolution.	“It’s	normal	in	human	beings	to	have	a	range	of	experiences.	We	have	intersex	experiences;	those	are	also	
pretty	normative	for	a	small	segment	of	the	population.	We	have	atypical	gender	experiences,	and	I	think	that’s	pretty	
normative,	just	like	being	gay	or	lesbian	is	pretty	normative.	It’s	a	part	of	the	population	that	is	selected	out.	It’s	continuing	
through evolution.” A normative phenomenon indicates that the presence of transgender people, like gay and intersex 
people, is naturally occurring through evolutionary means. Respondent 11 did note, however, that these identities exist 
as	“atypical”	experiences,	furthering	the	idea	that	“normative”	does	not	equate	to	normality,	but	rather	represents	an	
acceptable, naturally occurring other. 
78. Respondent 12.
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conceptualization of transgender identity can continue to rely on essentialist foundations of stability 
and realness.
  Overall, respondents expressed diverse and divergent essentialist conceptualizations 
of transgender identity. Some practitioners considered the psychical and corporeal body as a 
site of transgender identity and dysphoria. This conceptualization was most often advanced by 
practitioners with some and no experience working directly with transgender patients. Further, this 
conceptualization was articulated almost exclusively by practitioners who did not receive feminist 
teachings.	These	findings	are	in	line	with	existing	theories	on	essentialism.	The	tendency	to	conflate	
gender and sexuality, rely on the naturalness of transgender identity, and reinforce the gender binary 
were	evident	among	the	practitioners	interviewed.	A	more	unique	finding	is	the	nonbinary	yet	
essentialist	formulation;	the	extant	literature	does	not	discuss	the	ways	in	which	practitioners	use	
spectrum-oriented language while relying on essentialist foundations.
Transgender Identity as Agential
 Another conception of gender that resembles postmodern thought but, upon deeper analysis, 
relies on essentialist principles at its core is the model of the agential and self-determined Self.79 This 
model allows the freedom to identify oneself as one desires, based on how one internally sees oneself. 
	 Agential	models	can	conflict	with	social	constructionism	because	individuals	in	this	model	
see themselves as outside sociality and protected against societal harm through the mechanism 
of	self-identification.	This	conceptualization	of	identity	tends	to	dismiss	social	constructionism	as	
constraining and oppressive toward transgender individuals.80 Through individualized, nonsocially 
bounded	identifications,	transgender	individuals	are	defining	their	identities	for	themselves	and	by	
no one else, including societal and institutional standards and regulations.81
	 Transgender	theorist	Gayle	Salamon	asserts	in	her	work	Assuming a Body that this belief in 
corporeal	agency	and	autonomy	defined	for	and	by	transgender	individuals	is	uniquely	positioned	
in	the	field	of	gender	studies	and	discussions	on	autonomy	and	agency.	
This premise that the materiality of the transgendered body renders transgendered people 
outside or beyond gender leads to the assertion that what characterizes transgenderism, along 
with a specific kind of embodiment, is a specific kind of agency, and it is on this issue of agency 
that critiques of social constructionism are most assertively advanced.82
79.	This	notion	of	the	“Self”	is	drawn	from	Michel	Foucault,	The History of Sexuality, vol. 3, The Care of the Self	(New	York:	
Vintage	Books,	1988).
80. Jason Cromwell, Transmen and FTMs: Identities, Bodies, Genders, and Sexualities	(Champaign,	IL:	University	of	Illinois,	
1999);	Leslie	Feinberg,	Trans Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1998);	Viviane,	K.	Namaste,	“‘Tragic	
Misreadings’:	Queer	Theory’s	Erasure	of	Transgender	Subjectivity”	in	Invisible Lives: The Erasure of Transsexual and 
Transgendered People	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000)	9–23;	Julia	Serano,	Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on 
Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity	(Emeryville,	CA:	Seal	Press,	2007).
81.	Bettcher;	Heyes;	Salamon.	
82.	Salamon,	75.	
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This ideological rift between agentic-driven theorists, on the one hand, and socially constituted 
theorists, on the other, is deeply alive and felt in present-day politics and theoretical circles. An 
agential framework gives little credence to the question of societal constraint and instead places 
greater emphasis and belief in self/individual personhood. 
 This model allows for, and often encourages, labels and identities to rightfully exist for 
personal	and	political	purposes.	Many	transgender	theorists	and	individuals	advocate	a	notion	of	
gender	that	can	move	beyond	the	“men/women”	binary.83 In so doing, advocates of this conceptual 
position do not wholly reject identity but rather create and construct categories in accordance with 
how one sees or describes oneself. Transgender people are still, thus, grounded in identity, and as a 
group based in identity, they should have the right to choose their path forward and to be recognized 
“for	new	identities	and	lifestyles.”84 
	 The	field	of	transgender	theory	is	seeing	a	push	to	mark	a	body	as	the	sole	property	of	the	
individual through dress and expression. In other words, this body should be able to proclaim 
itself autonomously and, both corporeally and in mind, is capable of making its own decisions 
and transformations without outside societal interventions or commentary.85 This individualized 
gendered self is intended to be outside of criticism, for any self-expression should be celebrated 
and need not be rooted in dominant gendered discourses and power structures. Cressida Heyes 
explained,	“In	the	emerging	genre	of	popular	trans	feminist	polemic	…	the	rhetorical	emphasis	is	
squarely on the right of individuals to express their gender as they choose or to engage in free gender 
play.”86	Transgender	author	Leslie	Feinberg’s	comments	epitomize	this	trend:	“Since	I	don’t	accept	
negative judgments about my own gender articulation, I avoid judgments about others. People of all 
sexes	have	the	right	to	explore	femininity,	masculinity,	and	the	infinite	variations	between—without	
criticism or ridicule.”87 Thus, individuals have the right to explore the deep and vast variations 
of gender for themselves, and no one has the right to critique that process of exploration and 
identity	formation.	Most	critiques	of	any	gender	embodiments,	in	this	configuration,	likely	serve	an	
oppressive	function,	limiting	opportunities	for	individuals	to	explore	and	find	meaning	in	various	
aesthetics and embodiments.
83.	Gloria	Anzaldúa,	Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza	(San	Francisco:	Spinsters,	1987);	Holley	Boswell,	“The	
Transgender Paradigm Shift Toward Free Expression,” in Current Concepts in Transgender Identity,	ed.	Dallas	Denny	(New	York:	
Garland,	1998);	Feinberg;	Jillian	Hooley,	“Transgender	Politics,	Medicine	and	Representation:	Off	Our	Backs,	Off	Our	Bodies,”	
Social Alternatives	16,	no.	1	(1997):	31–4;	Serano;	Ashley	Tauchert,	“Beyond	the	Binary:	Fuzzy	Gender	and	the	Radical	Center,”	
in Unseen Genders: Beyond the Binaries,	eds.	F.	Haynes	and	T.	McKenna	(New	York:	Peter	Lang,	2001)	181–91;	Riki	Wilchins,	Read 
My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender	(Riverdale,	NY:	Riverdale	Avenue	Books,	1997).
84.	Francesca	Polletta	and	James	Jasper,	“Collective	Identity	and	Social	Movements,”	Annual Review of Sociology	27	(2001):	
286,	as	quoted	in	Bernstein,	“Identity	Politics.”
85.	This	autonomous	framework	is	similar	to	current	discourse	on	Beyoncé	and	her	gender	performance;	namely,	some	
cultural	commentators	proclaim	it	possible	for	Beyoncé	(and	women	more	generally)	to	make	decisions	about	her	body	
based	on	individual	empowerment	and	not	first	or	primarily	on	discourse	on	(self)	objectification	and	patriarchy	(see	
Kimberly	Foster,	“On	bell	hooks	and	Feminist	Blind	Spots:	Why	Theory	Will	Not	Set	Us	Free.”	For Harriet	(blog).	For	a	
counternarrative,	see	bell	hooks,	“Moving	Beyond	Pain,”	bell hooks Institute	(blog),	May	9,	2016.
86. Heyes, 1110.
87.	Feinberg,	25.
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 Some of the medical and mental health practitioners interviewed for this project seemed 
to	understand	transgender	identity	as	something	defined	solely	by	the	transgender	individuals	
themselves. Remarks that fall under this theme use and rely on alternative, nonbinary identity 
categories	like	genderqueer,	boi,	or	gender-fluid.	Six	responses	fall	under	this	theme,	all	of	which	
were stated by respondents with extensive experience. 
 Transgender identity is conceptualized as a personal and private experience. This private 
quality	of	gender,	as	conceptualized	in	this	model,	makes	it	difficult	to	organize	for	a	collective	
politics.	As	Respondent	9	explained,	
Gender and gender identity is such a powerful personal and also political attribute that people 
who struggle with it, and maybe people who don’t struggle with it, hold very dear... I think 
because of that, these terminologies break down because it’s hard to get a whole group of 
people to agree on a term when they’re having a very subjective, personal, often very private 
experience with gender.
Respondent	9’s	definition	of	transgender	identity	captures	several	phenomena.	First,	gender	and	
gender	identity	are	deeply	personal	parts	of	oneself	and	one’s	identity.	Second,	gender	identity’s	
“subjective”	nature	assumes	an	individualist	framework.	Standardization	cannot	exist	because	
each person is navigating their own gender in particular and unique ways. Third, this lack of 
standardization	makes	it	difficult	to	politically	mobilize	as	a	collective	“transgender	unit.”	
	 Importantly,	in	Respondent	9’s	remark,	essentialism	and	social	constructionism	both	appear	
present. The comment may rely on essentialism because this personal, subjective gender identity 
may be associated with an internal, hard-wired sense of self. On the other hand, the comment may 
be alluding to social constructionism in how that transgender person navigates, processes, and 
internalizes	society’s	gender	regulations.88 The mention of a subjective experience, therefore, does 
not cancel out the presence of either essentialist or social constructionist conceptualizations. It is 
only through contextual clues that an agential remark can be analyzed for its essentialist or social 
constructionist roots. 
	 Many	practitioners	articulated	the	importance	of	rejecting	a	standardized	definition	or	
script	for	transgender	identity.	By	following	the	client	as	an	individual	self-determining	subject,	
practitioners can broaden their conceptualization of transgender identity beyond essentialist 
frameworks.	Respondent	15	conceived	transgender	identity	as	unique	to	each	individual:	“It’s	
funny	because	as	a	therapist	I’m	so	used	to	not	having	my	own	definition	in	some	ways	because	I	
relearn	different	definitions	for	each	person	that	comes	in	my	room,	and	I	follow	their	lead	and	what	
they	self-identify	as,	and—if	and	how	they	want	to	label.”	The	practitioner’s	personal	definition	of	
transgender	identity	has	less	significance	than	those	offered	by	transgender	clients.	In	following	the	
patient’s	lead,	there	exists	the	possibility	to	both	resist	and	find	personal	empowerment	in	labels.89
88. For example, when the individual encounters the social realm, a subjective process may ensue in which they have to 
navigate	how	those	social	forces	affirm,	restrict,	and	shape	that	person.	
89.	Respondent	14	explained,	“The	labels	are	something	that	are	sort	of	self-determined	by	the	person	and	to	try	to	be	open	
to	meeting	them	and	not	sort	of	insisting	on	one	definition.”
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 Ultimately, an agential, self-determining model supported by practitioners means 
nonjudgmentally	accepting	a	client’s	gender	identification	(or	non-identification)	without	
reservation. However, none of these remarks explicitly addresses societal forces. They hint at the 
possibility	that	society’s	gender	regulations	may	have	an	impact	on	a	transgender	person,	but	they	
do not explicitly explore this component. While this conceptualization is empowering because it 
legitimizes and validates the lives and experiences of transgender people, it does little to address 
the social forces that affect an individual subject. Therefore, this conceptualization risks a certain 
removal	from	the	forceful	social	realm.	Such	a	finding	is	consistent	with	existing	theory.90	Lastly,	this	
conceptualization may fail to address the types or forms of gender enacted by patients. In the effort 
to accept and validate a patient without addressing sociality, a practitioner risks overlooking certain 
damaging forms of masculinity and femininity, whether intrapersonally or relationally.
Social Constructionism: Fluidity, Universality, Deconstruction
 In contrast to both essentialist and agential models, postmodern theorists argue that the 
very	existence	of	(stable)	identity	categories	functions	as	a	sort	of	regulation.	Identities	do	not	offer	
freedom, but suffocation.91 Social constructionists often advocate for an issue-based, universalizing 
politics rather than one grounded in an absolute, stable identity.92 Jacob Hale argued against an 
identity politics framework that maintains differential identities and categories at its core.93 Instead 
of focusing on biological differences between peoples, postmodernists analyze societal guidelines, 
regulations,	and	recognitions	at	play	in	determining	whether	persons	fit	within	or	beyond	rules	of	
normativity and normality. 
	 Judith	Butler	took	issue	with	the	essentialist	position	that	one	intrinsically	possesses	an	
internal	gender	identity,	based	most	prominently	if	not	solely	on	biological	grounds.	Butler’s	
philosophy	suggests	that	“gender	is	not	exactly	what	one	‘is’	nor	is	it	precisely	what	one	‘has,’”	but	
is	rather	it	is	“the	apparatus	by	which	the	production	and	normalization	of	masculine	and	feminine	
takes place along with the interstitial forms of hormonal, chromosomal, psychic, and performative 
that gender assumes.”94	Gender	is	thus	the	site	of	many	converging	discourses	driven	by	a	myriad	of	
forces based only in part, if at all, on the biological and hormonal sphere.
90.	Salamon.
91.	Postmodernists	offer	critiques	of	why	identity	politics	models	of	activism	will	not	work.	See	Bernstein;	Cerulo;	Nancy	
Fraser,	“Rethinking	Recognition,”	New Left Review	3	(2000):	107–20;	Urvashi	Vaid,	Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of 
Gay and Lesbian Liberation	(New	York:	Anchor,	1995).	In	their	view,	identity	“categories	will	not	alleviate	inequality	but	will	
reify those categories, which will increase the use of those categories to regulate and dominate subordinate status groups” 
(Bernstein,	56).	Political	scientist	Wendy	Brown	echoed	this	idea	in	her	1995	book	States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late 
Modernity, in which she argued that the act of advocating for rights for marginalized cultural identities will only lead to 
severe increased social regulation at the hands of the state.  
92.	I	use	the	term	“social	constructionism”	instead	of	“postmodernism”	from	this	point	forward.	The	two	terms	have	
different	theoretical	positions;	here,	I	find	“social	constructionism”	most	theoretically	relevant.
93.	Jacob	Hale,	“Tracing	a	Ghostly	Memory	in	My	Throat:	Reflections	on	FtM	Feminist	Voice	and	Agency,”	in	Men Doing 
Feminism,	ed.	T.	Digby	(New	York:	Routledge,	1998).
94.	Butler,	Undoing Gender, 42. 
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 Several theorists have taken issue with the self-determinist, nonsocially grounded 
conceptualization of the self, directly95 and indirectly.96 Heyes, for example, expressed concern 
with	Feinberg’s	conception	of	gender	identity,	arguing	that	Feinberg’s	view	“falls	back	onto	an	
implausibly atomistic self that is given normative free rain [sic] to assert its gender.”97 This atomistic 
Self wants to understand itself as separate from sociality and able to resist cultural demands of 
the body.98	Butler	vehemently	argued	against	such	a	conception.	For	Butler,	it	is	only	through	
engagement with sociality that one can begin to claim oneself.99 
 Throughout the interviews, the second most common theme advanced by medical and 
mental health practitioners was a social constructionist conceptualization of transgender identity. 
Overall, 23 statements were coded as under this conceptualization, 16 of which were expressed by 
those with extensive experience. Practitioners who advanced social constructionist understandings 
of transgender identity overwhelmingly had received feminist teachings. Of the 23 social 
constructionist remarks, 21 were made by practitioners with feminist teachings. The next section 
analyzes	the	following	subthemes:	(1)	occupation	of	an	undefined,	fluid	terrain,	(2)	trans	identity	as	
liberatory,	and	(3)	social	constructionism	as	culturally	bound.
AN UNDEFINED, FLUID TERRAIN
 The most common social constructionist conceptualization advanced by practitioners is the 
view	of	gender	identity	as	fluid.	The	fluidity	of	identity	allows	for	a	departure	from	the	normative	
conception of identity as stable or from the narrative of the congruent/incongruent individual. 
Statements	that	fall	under	the	“undefined,	fluid	terrain”	meet	at	least	one	of	the	following	criteria:	
(1)	indicate	satisfaction	with	an	undefined,	ambiguous	area	of	gender,	(2)	discuss	gender	as	fluid,	
(3)	discuss	gender	as	on	a	spectrum,	(4)	discuss	gender	as	flexible	rather	than	linear,	or	(5)	discuss	
gender as constantly changing. Eight statements match these criteria, three of which were articulated 
by	practitioners	with	no	experience	and	five	by	practitioners	with	extensive	experience.	
 
95.	Bettcher;	Heyes;	Emi	Koyama,	“The	Transfeminist	Manifesto,”	in	Catching a Wave: Reclaiming Feminism for the 21st 
Century,	ed.	Rory	Dicker	and	Alison	Piepmeier	(Boston:	Northeastern	University	Press,	2003)	244–259;	Salamon.	
96.	Judith	Butler,	Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex	(New	York:	Routledge,	1993);	Butler,	Gender Trouble;	
Butler,	Undoing	Gender;	Naomi	Scheman,	“Queering	the	Center	by	Centering	the	Queer:	Reflections	on	Transsexuals	and	
Secular Jews,” in Feminists Rethink the Self,	ed.	Diana	Tietjens	Meyers	(Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press,	1996),	124–162;	Elaine	
Stavro,	“Rethinking	Identity	and	Coalitional	Politics,	Insights	from	Simone	de	Beauvoir,”	Canadian Journal of Political Science 
40,	no.	2	(2007):	439–63.
97.	Heyes,	1095.	
98.	Bettcher;	Heyes.	“Atomistic”	is	defined	here	as	a	person	being	“abstracted	from	the	social	relations	in	
which	actual	agents	are	embedded.”	See	Natalie	Stoljar,	“Feminist	Perspectives	on	Autonomy,”	in	The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy,	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	fall	2015	ed.	
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/feminism-autonomy/.	
99.	Butler	explained,	“Although	we	struggle	for	rights	over	our	own	bodies,	the	very	bodies	for	which	we	struggle	are	not	
quite	ever	our	own.	The	body	has	its	invariably	public	dimension;	constituted	as	a	social	phenomenon	in	the	public	sphere,	
my	body	is	and	is	not	mine....	One	is	dependent	on	this	‘outside’	to	lay	claim	to	what	is	one’s	own.	The	self	must,	in	this	
way,	be	dispossessed	in	sociality	in	order	to	take	possession	of	itself”	(Butler	2004,	7–21).	
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Envisioning	gender	identity	as	fluid	offers	a	path	of	empowerment	and	liberation	for	transgender	
and non-transgender people. Fluid conceptualizations allow for the possibility of undoing an 
essentialist normative/nonnormative binary, viewing each individual as equally invested in the 
project of gender formation. Respondent 4 alluded to a shift in discourse taking place between 
traditional	conceptualizations	and	those	advanced	by	trans-affirming	therapists:	“I	think	those	
individuals	who	are	trans-positive	and	trans-affirming	have	moved	slightly	from	there	in	the	sense	
that	it	doesn’t	feel	...	Like	I	think	for	a	while	the	field	was	like,	‘There’s	this	disconnect	and	then	
there’s	not	a	disconnect.’	And	I	think	now	we’re	seeing	that	more	in	a	spectrum,	and	there’s	like	a	
fluidity	to	that.”	Respondent	4’s	remark	captures	a	powerful	shift	in	how	transgender	identity	is	
conceptualized.	Within	a	fluid	and	spectral	framework,	a	transgender	identification	is	able	to	escape	
the	limitations	of	both	the	binary	and	a	restricting/pathologizing	“congruent-incongruent”	divide.100 
 While a social constructionist framework is empowering, it can also foster contempt, 
resentment, and critique of transgender embodiments that rely on essentialist, binary models of 
gender expression. For example, Respondent 10 stated the following: 
Sometimes I get a little judgy when I hear people just, trans people, just stuck in that binary, 
you know? ‘I have to be a woman’, you know? ‘I was born a man but I’ve always felt like a 
woman and I’ve got to be a woman and I’m going to be a woman’... and sometimes I get judgy 
and I think, why can’t you just be you? ... Like why couldn’t this person just be genderqueer? 
Or gender-fluid? Or gender-something? Why did they have to be a woman? 
This statement captures a dissatisfaction with embodiments of gender identity that rely on the binary 
system	for	legitimacy.	The	respondent	not	only	critiqued	the	“born	in	the	wrong	body	narrative,”	but	
found	more	genuinity	in	a	person	who	prioritizes	queerness,	or	fluidity	and	ambiguity,	over	long-
established	identity	categories	(“man”	or	“woman”).	More	than	this,	though,	the	question	“why	can’t	
you	just	be	you?”	suggests	that	the	act	of	naming	oneself	as	a	particular,	pre-defined	gender	is	an	act	
of dissociation from oneself, rather than an empowering coming into oneself. This mode of thinking 
has both means for caution and possibility: The practitioner should be thoughtful about their 
judgments	of	a	transgender	person’s	embodiments.	This	mode	of	thinking,	however,	could	also	help	
in the therapeutic realm, compassionately challenging the patient and practitioner to understand the 
roots of the desired transformation.
100.	Respondent	15	noted	that	the	ability	to	escape	binary	conceptualizations	is	partly	dependent	on	generational	
differences.	For	example,	younger	people	[clients]	have	“a	lot	more	tolerance	of	the	ambiguity	of	that	fluidity....	So	even	if	
they	can’t	put	their	finger	on	it	or	maybe	one	day	they	feel	neutral,	one	day	they	feel	feminine,	one	day	they	feel	masculine.	
That’s	OK	…	But	with	the	older,	you	know	I	see	some	clients	who	came	in	their	60s	who	have	lived	in	this	society—in	this	
very	gendered	society,	let’s	say	for	60	odd	years.	It’s	a	different	mindset	because	I	think	especially	with	male	to	female	
clients,	there	can	be	a	big	focus	on	really	fitting	in	to	this	idealized	feminine.”	As	this	example	indicates,	generational	
differences	allow	for	conceptualizations	of	gender	that	move	beyond	binary	conceptions	and	hence	beyond	fitting	into	or	
enacting dominant forms of masculinity or femininity. 
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LIBERATION THROUGH THE FREEDOM TO EXPRESS; REJECTING AN AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE
 A social constructionist perspective on gender often rejects the necessity of an authentic 
transgender	narrative.	A	transgender	person	does	not	have	to	receive	surgery,	change	one’s	name,	
start	hormonal	treatments,	or	change	one’s	dress	in	a	particular	way	in	order	to	be	understood	as	
comprehensible or permissible.101	As	Respondent	4	noted,	being	transgender	is	not	(always)	the	
pursuit of surgery, but rather the act of engaging in a way different from, and in opposition to, 
culturally instituted norms and other societal restraints.102 A social constructionist conceptualization, 
in	advocating	fluidity,	allows	for	myriad	embodiments	of	gender	expressions.	
 Supporting more diverse modes of gender expression fosters liberatory possibilities for 
both adults and youth. This model of possibility requires less stress, regulation, and shame, for it 
decenters normality and centers diverse gender expressions.103	Three	respondent	remarks	fit	this	
model, all stated by participants with extensive experience. 
GENDER IDENTITY AS CULTURALLY BOUND
	 The	final	subtheme	involves	gender	identity	as	culturally	constituted.	By	drawing	on	
gender experiences from around the world, these respondents placed the dominant US binary 
conception of gender in relation to mostly international alternatives. These practitioners view 
traditional	essentialist	conceptions	of	transgender	identity	as	limited	and	deeply	constructed.	By	
referencing diverse examples of gender presentations across the globe, these respondents added to 
the general critique of the US two-gender model, particularly the belief in two sexes, a strict binary 
understanding of gender, and the limited roles and behaviors that people of each gender must 
embody and perform.104 
 An understanding of various gender-diverse cultures throughout the world allows one to 
imagine different, more liberatory gender possibilities in the United States. When one is able to refer 
to	cultures	with	three,	four,	or	even	five	gender	categories,	one	is	able	to	imagine	different	ways	
101.	Respondent	15	said,	“There	is	no	right	or	wrong	way	to	transition.	It	is	so	dependent	upon	the	person.	It	could	be	that	
dressing is something satisfying to them and that is how they want to express their gender identity and that keeps them 
going.	It	could	be	that	that’s	not	enough.	It	could	be	that	they	want	real	name	change,	they	want	hormones,	they	want	some	
surgery of some kind.” 
102.	To	illustrate	this	point,	Respondent	4	offered	the	following:	“So	I	have	some	bi-gendered	clients	who	are	like,	‘I’m	not	
having	surgery	but	I’m	not	going	to	express	my	gender	the	way	that	society	tells	me	to	be.’	I	think	it’s	messy.	And	I’m	a	
person that, I personally am okay with that messiness.” 
103. For example, Respondent 10 explained how the use of rigid gender norms creates anxiety and identity crises later 
in	life.	This	anxiety	is	rectified	by	the	eventual	transition	from	“man	to	woman”	or	“woman	to	man.”	However,	with	the	
advancement and acceptance of gender variance, there may be no need to transition in this binary way. Respondent 10 
grounded	this	in	the	principle	that	“if	I	had	my	perfect	world,	I	would	say	that	every	kid	should	be	embraced	for	whatever	
it	is	they	want	to	do.	If	they’re	a	little	boy	and	they	want	to	wear	fingernail	polish	to	school,	they	should	be	able	to	do	that	
and not be humiliated or ashamed or anything about it. And I think if we allowed kids to express gender variance more, 
then	I	think	there’d	be	less	angst	and	issues	about	being	transgender	in	adolescents	and	adults.”	
104. Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2000);	
Judith	Lorber,	Paradoxes of Gender	(New	York:	Yale	University	Press,	1994);	Dorothy	Smith,	The Conceptual Practices of Power 
(Boston:	Northeastern	University	Press,	1990).
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of	being.	After	discussing	the	two-spirit	peoples	in	certain	indigenous	North	American	tribes,105 
Respondent 10 offered the following global examples: 
If people understood ‘Wow, there’s actually six different places you can be!,’ I think you’d have 
a lot less people transitioning from male to female or female to male. But I think growing up in 
a monotheistic culture, you’re programmed to think that you’re either this or you’re that. And 
that’s just a big mistake. Because all over the world, there are third and fourth gendered people. 
For example, in India there are the Hijra and in Samoa there’s the Fa’afafine, and I could just 
go around the planet. There are just so many cultural opportunities to be something other than 
male or female.
 Cultural comparison enables one to critically analyze the limited possibilities in a two-gender 
model.	Whereas	individuals	in	other	cultures	may	find	it	possible	to	embody	a	body	that	is	not	“one	
or the other,” the two-gender model constricts and constructs bodies to perform and express in a 
particular way. As Respondent 10 pointed out, a binary actively affects/regulates gender-variant 
bodies. Examples of extrabinary models challenge one to rethink the function and necessity of 
surgical and hormonal treatments and transitions.
 The strict, binary gender model active in the United States mirrors a wider propensity for a 
binary, oppositional politics. The restriction of gender performances and identity is just one of many 
forms	of	bodily	and	theoretical	restrictions.	According	to	Respondent	10,	a	culture’s	theological	
grounding in monotheism is largely responsible for creating a system in which particular beliefs are 
correct and all others are deemed invalid. 
When you have monotheistic cultures with the belief in one God, like Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam, [people] grow up believing ‘Either you believe in our God or you’re wrong.’ Or 
‘either you’re good or you’re evil.’ Remember that’s what George Bush said when he went to 
war in Iraq. He said to all those European countries, ‘Either you’re with us or you’re on the 
axis of evil.’ It’s like he’s saying everyone has to make a choice.... And monotheistic people tend 
to believe, you’re either a male or female, or you’re either you’re gay or you’re straight, and 
they don’t make much room for bisexual people or gender-variant people.
Respondent	10’s	statement	suggests	that	religion,	and	the	belief	in	a	singular	God,	is	responsible	
for or reinforces the societal expectation for singularity of thought and noncomplexity. When one 
believes	in	one	God,	one	believes	in	one	way	of	thinking.	As	Respondent	10	later	explored,	this	may	
differ	from	notions	of	fluidity	and	impermanence	advanced	in	Buddhism,	a	faith	that	moves	away	
from	attachment	to	right	and	wrong,	a	“this	or	that”	way	of	thinking,	and	the	stable	unchanging	“I/
self.”106	To	live	in	a	culture	that	finds	its	theological	and	theoretical	foundations	in	nonstability,	or	in	
the belief that ideologies and corporeal embodiments that may not already existence or be seen are
105.	Evelyn	Blackwood,	“Sexuality	and	Gender	in	Certain	Native	American	Tribes:	The	Case	of	Cross-Gender	Females,”	
Signs	10,	no.	1	(1984):	27–42.
106.	Jack	Kornfield,	The Wise Heart: A Guide to the Universal Teachings of Buddhist Psychology	(New	York:	Bantam	Books,	2008).	
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possible, raises important possibilities and hope for the creation of alternative ways of being that do 
not rely on a strict model of thought and gender performance.
	 Respondent	10’s	remarks	raise	some	questions,	however.	For	example,	do	monotheist-driven	
cultures often, if not always, rely on oppositional ways of thinking? Further, do predominantly 
Buddhist	societies,	or	societies	that	are	polytheistic	or	pluralist,	always	err	against	binary	thinking?	
Religion	may	play	a	strong	role	in	molding	discourse	and	shaping	the	trajectory	of	a	society’s	
ideological and political beliefs, but even faiths with particular ideologies and values do not always 
hold	true	or	find	themselves	present	in	every	arena	of	society.
	 Finally,	Respondent	10’s	invocation	of	former	President	George	W.	Bush’s	remarks	signals	
a	misattribution	of	the	role	of	faith	and	politics.	When	President	Bush	stated,	“Either	you’re	with	
us	or	you’re	on	the	axis	of	evil,”	what	forms	of	power	were	at	play?	If	one	buys	into	the	belief	that	
monotheism	fosters	singular	thinking,	then	monotheism	may	have	played	a	role	in	Bush’s	statement	
and	belief	that	one	is	either	on	the	side	of	the	United	States	(and	against	terrorism	and	weapons	
of	mass	destruction)	or	against	the	State.	However,	when	Bush	spoke,	he	was	never	outside	of	a	
discourse on United States supremacy, Christocentrism, and colonialism. In the context of speaking 
to	Western	European	nations	on	the	subject	of	Iraq,	Bush	was	actively	creating	and	playing	on	
divisions between Islam and Christianity, and Islam and the West. To speak of monotheism as a 
singular entity would be to deny the ways in which Christianity, whiteness, and Western/United 
States	supremacy	informed	and	drove	Bush’s	remark.	Therefore,	while	faith	may	have	a	part	in	
creating an oppositional politic—including a politic of gender performativity and identity—it cannot 
be the only system of power at play, not when accounting for the intersection of race, nation, and 
Christian supremacy.
 Overall, social constructionist remarks were stated predominantly by practitioners with 
extensive experience working with transgender patients and by those who received feminist 
teachings.	These	findings	reflect	existing	research,	especially	as	it	pertains	to	the	presence	of	feminist	
teachings. Those who were trained to deconstruct understandings around masculinity/femininity 
continued to embrace such methods of thinking in their therapeutic work.
An Intervention toward Gender Liberation
 How do practitioners, and people more generally, come to understand gender as operating 
in particular ways? When practitioners speak about issues of race, gender, class, and other systems 
of power, their knowledge and understandings come from somewhere. Without intervention, they 
are grounded most often in a discourse that is already in existence, even before thinking or uttering 
a word upon the subject.107 In the United States, the discourse that is always already in existence—
always already undergirding the media, dominant education, the medical complex—is one of 
essentialism.108 The implication is that when people speak on topics of race and gender, they are 
107.	Butler,	Undoing Gender.
108.	Drescher;	Diana	Fuss,	Essentially	Speaking	(New	York:	Routledge,	1989);	Carla	Golden,	“Still	Seeing	Differently,	After	
All	These	Years,” Feminism & Psychology	10	(2000):	30–5;	Julia	T.	Wood,	Gendered Lives: Communication, Gender, & Culture 
(Stamford,	CT:	Cengage	Learning,	2014).
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speaking out of an understanding that these identities are deeply real and biologically wired, that 
these identities are intrinsic and do not come from a site of knowledge created by and for institutions 
and societal apparatuses.109 The reality, however, is that certain forms of knowledge and concepts are 
restrictive and can impact engagement with others,110 both in everyday life and in the clinical sphere. 
 Practitioners in this study with some and no experience embraced essentialist positions because 
they are a default position in US society. Practitioners with no and some experience have had few, 
if any, opportunities to understand gender, particularly transgender identity, as operating outside 
dominant cultural standards.111 In US discourse, transgender identity is most commonly understood as 
a	“born	in	the	wrong	body”	phenomenon.	Intrinsic	in	this	narrative	are	essentialist	principles	that	limit	
particularly transgender, but necessarily all gendered, patients. As Karen Cerulo stated, 
Socially defined maleness and femaleness severely constrict human behavior. Subjective 
definitions imprison individuals in spheres of prescribed action and expectation… Gender 
scripting attitudes, behaviors, emotions, and language, and treating these scripts as natural 
signals, ensures that social members both succumb to and recreate the “armor” of gender 
identity stereotypes.112
 Cerulo warned against the prescriptive functions and effects of biological and gender-based 
stereotypes, most often grounded in essentialist frameworks. In effect, a person or practitioner using 
limiting	subjective	definitions	based	in	“natural	signals”	of	gender	can	(unconsciously)	restrict	a	
patient’s	embodiment	into	one	of	more	normative	form.113
 In this study, the practitioners who advanced essentialist positions often expected 
transgender patients to be stable in their identity, tended to frame and pathologize transgender 
identity	as	“something	to	be	fixed,”	and	often	expected	masculinity	and	femininity	to	operate	
normatively,	whether	through	dress,	sexually,	or	in	one’s	internal	sense	of	self.	Transgender	patients	
who	understand	their	gender	to	be	fluid,	or	explain	or	express	their	gender	identity	in	nonbinary	
ways,	may	not	be	comprehended	as	easily	under	an	essentialist	framework.	Because	essentialist	
practitioners tie identity so strictly to biology and a natural internal stability, they may struggle to see 
how	identity	is	formulated	through	sociality.	This	finding	is	in	line	with	the	extant	literature:	Clinical	
practices	that	do	not	acknowledge	society’s	impact	on	a	patient	and	a	patient’s	narrative	can	deeply	
limit and restrict analysis.114 
	 Based	on	the	findings	of	this	study,	I	believe	that	social	constructionist	conceptualizations	
of	transgender	identity	(and	gender	broadly)	are	most	helpful	for	transgender,	and	all	gendered,	
109.	Butler,	Gender Trouble.
110.	Michel	Foucault,	The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction	(New	York:	Pantheon	Books,	1978);	Foucault,	Madness 
and Civilization.
111.	This	understanding	is	supported	by	Carroll	and	Gilroy.	
112. Cerulo, 388.
113.	Association;	Benson;	Lev.	
114.	Association;	Benson.
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patients because they do not require a coherent narrative. The practitioners in this study who 
advanced social constructionist conceptualizations were open to ideologically and corporeally 
diverse embodiments: These practitioners understood that sometimes transgender identity may 
come with the desire and need for surgery or hormones, but they viewed transgender embodiment 
as	multidimensional	and	a	process	of	constant	transformation	of	dress,	behavior,	identification,	and	
ideology. For these practitioners—under a social constructionist conceptualization—essentialist 
understandings	of	the	self,	agential	identifications,	and	completely	fluid	nonnormative	transgender	
embodiment all count as valid. This mode of engagement with patients aligns with the standards 
outlined	in	ALGBTIC’s	“Competencies	for	Counseling	with	Transgender	Clients.”
 This study explored two primary questions: When restrictive discourses take hold, how can 
one	find	a	way	out,	or	at	least	find	a	different	path?	What	would	help	facilitate	social	constructionist	
understandings	of	the	self?	During	my	research,	“feminist	teachings”	proved	to	be	powerful	tools	
for	transforming	and	expanding	critical	thought	and	inquiry.	I	define	“feminist	teachings”	as	those	
that	(1)	deconstruct	the	binary	between	“male”	and	“female”	or	“man”	and	“woman,”	(2)	challenge	
individuals	to	(re)evaluate	their	understanding	of	gender	and	to	consider	how	dominant	notions	of	
gender	may	impact	their	work,	(3)	center	on	the	socialization	of	gender	identity,	or	(4)	incorporate	
the	word	“feminism”	when	explaining	a	shift	in	essentialist	gender	politics.115	Because	of	the	
sample	size	of	my	study,	I	cannot	definitively	state	that	feminist	teachings	directly	produce	social	
constructionist conceptualizations of transgender identity. However, throughout the interviews, 
I found feminist teachings to be a better predictor of a social constructionist perspective than 
experience working with transgender people. After all, some practitioners with little or no experience 
working with transgender people espoused social constructionist conceptualizations of transgender 
identity	and	gender	more	broadly.	This	finding	suggests	that	graduate	school	courses	that	challenged	
practitioners to deeply evaluate their way of thinking, gender embodiments, and gender positionality 
continue to prove relevant, regardless of the population those practitioners serve.
 Practitioners could have developed social constructionist conceptualizations of identity and 
power	prior	to	their	exposure	to	feminist	teachings.	My	research	counters	this	critique:	Practitioners	
explicitly named the transformational aspects of their feminist education in molding their personal 
and professional outlook on life toward sociality rather than a purely intrapersonal engagement 
that	psychology	can	so	often	be	rooted	in.	This	finding	may	prove	particularly	significant	for	future	
research.
	 Both	in	this	study	and	in	scholarship,	feminist	teachings	matter	in	the	production	of	
deconstructive thought and alternative gender possibilities.116 Thus, I advocate mandatory feminist 
teachings	in	graduate	school	classes	for	future	practitioners.	Based	on	my	research,	these	teachings	
should	include	(1)	assignments	that	challenge	students	to	evaluate	gender	norms	in	their	personal	
lives,	(2)	a	focus	on	deconstructionism	and	categorical	construction,	and	(3)	the	introduction	of	
research on gender stereotyping and discrimination. These recommendations are in line with prior 
115.	My	understanding	of	“feminist	teachings”	was	inspired	in	part	by	Elizabeth	Tisdell’s	explanation	of	a	feminist	
postructuralist education.
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research on feminist therapy and educational practices,117 but place a stronger emphasis on the 
learning of gender oppression more broadly in constructing identity, rather than a more centered 
focus	on	transgender	identity	and	trans-affirmative	therapy.
 In this study, several respondents indicated that feminist undergraduate and graduate school 
courses directly helped them understand gender and power. Respondents who received feminist 
teachings overwhelmingly advanced broad conceptions of gender identity that were grounded in 
social constructionism and postmodern thought.118 Respondent 1, who had no experience working 
with	transgender	patients,	exemplified	this	background,	expressing	how	a	feminist	professor	directly	
affected their understanding of gendered phenomena. In the quote below, Respondent 1 is describing 
a class assignment in which each student had to present a history of their family to the class. 
I remember her listening to all that I had gathered about my family going back to the mid-
1800s. Everything that I could possibly find. And listening to everything. And she said, ‘You 
know what? The problem with your family is that you have this massive toxic masculinity 
going on in your family. And it, it clouds everything that you do.’ And, I don’t think that she 
was entirely wrong... I think it was the first time that I thought about it [masculinity] in that 
way. Because I think prior to that, I thought about my father and my grandfather as being 
tough guys who were admired for their athletic prowess and their ability to defend themselves 
and their ability to earn respect from people. And there were moments in my life where I 
thought that was kind of cool, you know? And realized later that that sort of domineering way 
of living is not healthy.
The	professor	pushing	Respondent	1	to	consider	the	toxicity	of	their	family’s	masculinity	was	a	
transformative	moment.	The	professor’s	challenge	pushed	Respondent	1	to	evaluate	how	this	
masculinity was toxic, causing the student to reconsider those qualities that are dominantly 
considered	“healthy,”	admired,	and	valued	but	through	analysis	and	deconstruction	are	understood	
as	“unhealthy”	and	undeservedly	valued	characteristics.	The	feminist	challenge	offered	by	
Respondent	1’s	professor	caused	them	to	undo	and	evaluate	those	hegemonic	values	that	“cloud	
everything you do.” This example demonstrates how feminist teachings aided in a transformation 
of thought, in the ability to contemplate and speak on issues of femininity and masculinity not 
previously explored. A practitioner with stronger gender competence is likely to have a practice that 
is more supportive of and welcoming to transgender clients.119
 The following except shows that Respondent 4, who has extensive experience working with 
transgender	patients,	exemplifies	how	a	professor’s	teachings	and	strategies	for	undoing	social	
harms	affect	and	are	later	reflected	in	that	practitioner’s	own	methodology	in	clinical	practice.	
117.	Ibid.;	Benson.
118.	By	“gender	more	broadly,”	I	only	mean	that	these	are	conceptualizations	of	gender	that	do	not	specifically	address	the	
question of transgender identity, but relate to their overall philosophies and understandings of gendered phenomena more 
broadly. This involves wrestling with gender roles, with what masculinity and femininity mean, with what gendered bodies 
overall experience, etc. 
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I went to go study with my advisor because she did specific work with LGBT issues in 
psychology.... I sought her out...When I went on my interview, I specifically said, “Are you 
LGBT little t big LGB or do you actually get it?” And she was really open and said, “I do get 
it. I really actively deconstruct gender binaries in my work. I identify as a feminist.” That’s a 
really big deal for me.
The	professor’s	response	reflects	a	particular	way	of	understanding	feminism.	This	professor	
strongly	associates	with	this	term,	not	for	any	general	reason,	but	for	the	specific	purpose	of	
deconstructing gender binaries in her work and incorporating her value of deconstruction into 
her	LGBT	research.	The	project	of	deconstructing	is	strongly	associated	with	social	constructionist	
thought, for deconstruction requires actively undoing and questioning those power structures and 
discourses	that	seem	apparent,	that	seem	“natural,”	that	seem	to	be	“just	there.”120 Differently stated, 
deconstructionism is a tool for undoing essentialist modes of understanding identity formations. 
Respondent 4 not only learned from the professor, but seems to replicate those sociological 
interventions in their own work by deconstructing and naming discourses. 
I do a lot of message unpacking and message critiquing. That’s like half of my job. I’m a message 
critiquer around like, “Let’s talk about the world that you live in. Let’s talk about the messages 
that you may not even have had a chance to sit down and think about. But when we actually sit 
down and you unpack those, what have you learned that’s not true to who you are but you have 
adopted as truths? ...We are in a world that likes to put things in a lot of compartmental boxes, 
and people with dissonance around that, they really struggle in certain ways. 
These remarks follow postmodernist and social constructionist thought. While the work is centered 
on an internal process, that internal process does not have essentialist roots. The roots, rather, are 
in critiquing the messages that one has received from the outside—deconstructing the boxes that 
have been drawn around identity that force or corner people into engaging in a certain discourse, 
whether	through	dress,	identification,	personality	traits,	or	something	else.	This	feminist	educational	
intervention	challenges	the	future	practitioner	to	specifically	evaluate	the	“truths”	that	one	has	
adopted and work to undo those socially effected and enacted processes.121 The ability to undo 
“categorical	truths”	can	strengthen	practitioners’	clinical	practices,	enabling	them	to	offer	more	
support to their clients. 
 Class discussions and explorations of research around gender stereotypes can broaden a 
person’s	way	of	thinking.122 Respondent 13 delved into how their education helped them realize 
120. Tisdell.
121. Ibid. There are other causes and effects of attaining either a feminist upbringing, a feminist education, or a feminist 
framework, all of which connect with a conceptualization of gender identity based in socially construed thought. For 
example,	Respondent	10	discussed	their	feminist	upbringing	during	the	1960s	based	“in	advocacy	for	women’s	rights	and	
equality.”	Lastly,	Respondent	15	discussed	the	universalization	of	body	hate	by	cisgender	people	as	well	as	transgender	
individuals	because	of	prevailing	social	norms.	Respondent	15,	who	has	extensive	experience	working	with	transgender	
people, advocated for understanding the body as a creative canvass in order to liberate the self. 
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that when social desirability is considered and evaluated, one is able to undo stereotypical thinking 
around	“male”	and	“female”	characteristics,	and	be	left	ultimately	with	androgyny—a	neutral	and	
liberated	way	of	being.	In	reflecting	on	how	education	impacted	their	understandings	of	gender,	
Respondent 13 noted the following: 
Yes in a very big way.... I can still cite the research that we would cover. And we had long 
discussions about stereotypic thinking—like what is male and what is female when you’re 
talking about gender. So that the attitude was that these personality inventories is really 
influenced by what could be considered social desirability.
That Respondent 13 could still cite the research covered in class around gender stereotyping, 
personality	inventories,	and	social	desirability	is	significant.	Even	though	the	practitioner’s	clinical	
practice does not focus on issues of gender identity, and although this practitioner took this class 
decades ago, they were still able to incorporate information from that class into their current-day 
reckonings	with	transgender	identity	and	gender	more	broadly.	This	finding	has	implications	
for future educational interventions: Even a limited engagement with research around the social 
construction of gender and the creation of roles around femininity and masculinity can help 
transform thought by providing tools of critical inquiry that can make a longstanding impact on a 
person’s	intellectual,	social,	and	individual	understandings	of	the	self.	
 Overall, in an effort to supply practitioners with the tools to critically analyze their lives 
through the lens of systems of power and constructed gender rules, roles and regulations, I 
recommend making classes that address feminism and intersectionality—and explain and expose 
gender	norms	and	regulations—a	mandatory	part	of	graduate	school	curricula.	My	research	
demonstrates	that	“feminist	teachings”	gave	practitioners	the	tools	to	deconstruct,	critically	analyze,	
and self-evaluate the ways in which cultural and societal gender norms operate in their life and in 
the lives of people around them. In some cases, feminist teachings helped deepen their personal 
lives and transformed their therapeutic practices. Such teachings have transformational possibilities 
and tend to expand critical thought and aid in moving beyond the gender binary, particularly 
when	introduced	in	graduate	school	education.	Both	my	findings	in	this	study	and	prior	research123 
demonstrate that feminist teachings can transform conceptualizations of gender and understandings 
of gendered constructs, leading to greater gender possibilities, and the comprehension of more 
gender embodiments, for the self, for patients, and for all other gendered beings. 
Conclusion
	 Among	the	15	medical	and	mental	health	practitioners	interviewed	for	this	study,	those	with	
no or only some experience working with transgender patients, and those without feminist teachings, 
overwhelmingly advanced essentialist conceptualizations of transgender identity. Practitioners with 
no experience working with transgender patients offered only a few socially constructed remarks and 
no conceptions of an agential, self-determining transgender subject. Only practitioners with extensive 
123.	Association;	Benson;	Carroll	and	Gilroy;	Tisdell.	
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experience maintained agential conceptualizations. Finally, respondents with extensive experience 
seldom articulated essentialist positions. Instead, practitioners with extensive experience, and those 
with feminist teachings, most often voiced understandings of transgender identity grounded in social 
constructionism. 
	 These	findings	have	educational	policy	implications.	Feminist	teachings	seemed	to	be	a	key	
factor in pushing practitioners to critically engage sociality. Practitioners who espoused essentialist 
understandings of transgender identity did not receive feminist teachings and did not partake in 
formative, deconstructive practices that most likely would have critically addressed essentialist 
frameworks. Feminist teachings enabled practitioners to deconstruct and self-evaluate the ways in 
which	social	gender	norms	operate	in	their	life	and	in	the	lives	of	people	around	them.	Because	of	the	
transformational possibilities of such teachings and their tendency to expand critical thought and aid 
in moving beyond the gender binary, I argue that feminist teachings should be a mandatory part of 
any graduate school training.
 An avenue for future research could be to explore how degree-type affects practitioner 
philosophies and conceptualizations of gender. Different types of graduate education could affect 
and yield different conceptualizations of transgender identity. In addition, when a practitioner 
attained	their	degree	should	also	be	considered.	Generational	differences	may	account	for	different	
schooling content. Thirdly, future studies may seek to measure differences in respondent remarks 
based on class, race, and gender differences. Finally, future research should systematically analyze 
how different conceptualizations of transgender identity impact treatment and engagement with 
transgender	patients.	Though	this	study	hints	at	how	conceptualizations	may	influence	treatment,	it	
does not examine this line of inquiry in depth. Future studies should methodologically explore the 
effects that personal conceptualizations of transgender identity advanced by medical practitioners 
have on treatment and engagement with patients. 
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